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Foreword 
 
This report presents the major areas of research and key findings of the international 
research project on ‘Macroeconomic Policy Challenges of Low Income Countries’. The 
project aims to contribute to a better understanding of the macroeconomic problems of 
low income countries, and facilitate an exchange of views with academics and 
researchers based in developed economies, including those in the international financial 
community.  
 
In this report, the authors explore the options available for policy makers on revenue 
mobilization in Uganda. They tackle fundamental policy questions about what measures 
could result into fast revenue growth for Uganda focusing on the tax reforms and 
macroeconomic issues. The elasticity and buoyancy indexes computed for the pre and 
post-reform periods as well as for the combined period provide a framework through 
which the impact of the reforms on each index between the two periods can be discerned. 
The approach provides the basis for identifying the sources of fast revenue growth and/or 
lagging revenue growth in the tax system, and the components of revenue growth which 
are within or outside the control of authorities.  
 
This study offers practical lessons for Uganda and other African countries attempting to 
achieve their revenue targets.  
 
We thank the Uganda team for their recommendable work and the external reviewer, 
Professor Peter Warr of the Australian National University for his technical support. The 
project could not have been undertaken without the generous financial support of the 
Governments of United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank. Gary McMahon and Robert Dodd at the GDN Secretariat in 
Washington, D.C. provided excellent administrative and professional back-up. However, 
the views expressed in this report are entirely those of the authors and do not necessary 
represent GDN’s own policies or views or of its funding partners.  
 
 
Global Development Network
 
  
   
 III 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 1 
 
2. Fiscal Operations and Tax Reforms ................................................................................................ 3 
2.1  Aggregate level of government spending and the budget deficit .......................................... 3 
2.2  Uganda’s tax effort ........................................................................................................................................ 4 
2.3  Major tax reforms in Uganda .................................................................................................................... 9 
2.4  Structure of domestic taxes .................................................................................................................... 15 
2.5  Revenue corruption .................................................................................................................................... 21 
 
3. Analytical Framework ............................................................................................................................. 26 
3.1  Elasticity index and tax buoyancy........................................................................................................ 26 
3.2  Estimation procedure ................................................................................................................................. 28 
3.3  Impact of macroeconomic variables on tax revenue ................................................................. 29 
3.4  Proxy tax bases and data sources ...................................................................................................... 31 
 
4. Reforms and Responses of the Tax Revenues to Income .............................................. 32 
4.1  Elasticity estimates for the pre and post-reform period, combined .................................... 32 
4.2  Elasticity estimates for the pre-reform period ................................................................................ 34 
4.3  Elasticity estimates for post-reform period ...................................................................................... 35 
4.4  Comparison between pre and post-reform period....................................................................... 37 
 
5. Tax Responses to Changing Economic Trends .................................................................... 37 
5.1  Impact of external aid and fiscal deficit ............................................................................................. 38 
5.2  Impact of foreign exchange rate ........................................................................................................... 39 
5.3  Impact of inflation ......................................................................................................................................... 40 
5.4  Impact of literacy rate ................................................................................................................................ 41 
 
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................. 41 
 
References .............................................................................................................................................................. 44 
Appendixes ............................................................................................................................................................. 47 
 
 
 
  
   
 IV 
List of Tables and Figures 
Table: 
1. Summary of elasticity: direct and indirect taxes, and overall tax system   vi 
2. Summary of elasticity: import and excise duties, and VAT/sales tax                     vii 
3. Uganda: Government revenues and expenditures, 1997/98-2003/04   3 
4. Economic Indicators for Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa                      8 
5.  Value Added Tax in Selected SSA Countries, 2003/04    17 
6. Uganda: Elasticity of main taxes, 1988/89-2003/04    32 
7. Uganda: Elasticity of main taxes, 1988/89-1995/96     34 
8. Uganda: Elasticity of main taxes, 1996/97-2003/04    35 
9. Uganda: OLS Results for Income Tax and Import duty Revenues  37 
  
Figure: 
1. Tax Revenue as % of GDP, 1997-2004        5 
2. Taxes on International Trade as % of Total Tax Revenue     6 
3. Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services as % of Total Tax Revenue   6 
 
  
   
 IV 
Executive Summary 
 
This paper focuses on the requirement to increase government revenue in Uganda and the 
ways various taxes have responded to changing economic environment. Specifically, the 
paper looks at the tax reforms implemented by the government and how revenue yields of 
individual taxes and the overall tax system have responded to changes in GDP (or proxy 
bases). We computed elasticity and buoyancy indexes for the pre - and post-reform 
periods as well as the combined period based on primary data from four main sources: 
the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA); Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS); Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development; and Bank of Uganda.   
 
Fiscal operations and tax reforms 
 
Analysis shows that the growth in domestic revenue in Uganda has hardly kept pace with 
the growth of the economy especially the growing expenditure demands. In 2003/04, 
while the share of revenue to GDP was 12.6 percent, the share of total government 
expenditure to GDP was 24.1 percent. The fiscal deficit nearly doubled to 11.5 percent in 
2003/04 from 6.5 percent in 1997/98. The absolute expansion in the size of government 
budget explains the increase in the budget deficit, which is partly financed by external 
borrowing.  
 
Major tax reforms implemented since 1990s aimed at addressing these fiscal challenges 
facing the country. Reforms were directed at improving administrative efficiency and to 
ensure better taxpayer compliance. It aimed at rationalizing the tax structure and rates, 
widening the tax base, reducing exemptions and simplifying tax procedures. High and 
differentiated taxes and tariff rates, burdensome bureaucratic requirements, discretionary 
exemptions and tax incentives were considered to be a source of inefficiency in the tax 
system.  
 
In order to improve revenue administration, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was 
set up in 1991 as a semi-autonomous agency to collect taxes. The value-added-tax (VAT) 
was introduced in 1996 to replace Sales Tax and Commercial Transaction Levy (CTL). A 
new Income Tax Act was enacted in 1997. The Act broadened the definition of taxable 
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income; and eliminated (most) discretionary tax exemptions and tax incentives. 
Substantial attempts were also made to modernize and automate customs and VAT 
administration. In addition, Tax Identification Number (TIN), the Large Tax Payer 
Department (LTD), pre-shipment inspection and GATT valuation system and the Tax 
Appeal Tribunal, as well as a system of paying taxes through commercial banks were 
introduced.   
 
As a result, revenue increased from 7.82 percent of GDP in 1990/91 to 12.6 percent in 
2003/04. Notwithstanding these improvements, revenue/GDP is still below the 1970/71 
level of over 13 percent, and remains low by the standards of many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa that on average collect about 23% of GDP in revenues. However, since 
the 1990s Uganda’s tax structure has been greatly improved and it appears to mirror the 
tax system in other SSA countries, in terms of the types of taxes and rates. There is not 
much that remains to be done, except to administer it equitably and efficiently.  
 
While the differences in excise rates and bases and exemptions under VAT, import duty 
and income tax (coupled with high income tax threshold) seemingly explain, in part, the 
low tax/GDP in Uganda, relative to other countries, greater explanations are likely to lie 
with differences in the levels of development, the structure of the economies, degree of 
commercialization and urbanization, size of the peasant population, poverty, tax 
administration capability and level of corruption, among other factors. 
 
There are indications that widespread corruption (bribery, smuggling, falsification/ 
forging of documents, under-declaring of goods and income, tax fraud, etc.) in the tax 
system has undermined growth in revenue. Corruption has persisted despite several anti-
corruption measures undertaken by government, including privatization of some of the 
customs operation, and use of automated system (in customs and the VAT operations) 
and special services of revenue protection/anti-smuggling (para-military) unit.  
 
Corruption could be reduced by building tax compliance and winning public confidence 
through improved service delivery and government payment and procurement system 
(prompt payment to government suppliers/service providers, transparent and equitable 
awarding of contracts). Making the tax procedures simple and transparent, and educating 
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taxpayers on tax laws and collection systems will enable taxpayers to know what their 
obligations are towards revenue collection. Effective use of automated systems especially 
in the clearing system and monitoring refund claims will reduce on frauds associated with 
VAT refunds and customs operations. These should be reinforced by strengthening tax 
administration including staff investigative machinery and human resource management 
capability. 
  
Reforms and responses of the tax revenues to changes in income 
 
Table 1 summarizes the income elasticity of the direct and indirect taxes and the overall 
tax system in Uganda; in the pre - and post-reform periods.  
Table 1. Summary of elasticity: direct and indirect taxes, and overall tax system 
   Elasticity indexes 
Direct taxes Pre-reform Post-reform 
    tax-to-income  0.706 2.082 
    base-to-income  1.479 2.021 
    tax-to-base  0.479 1.031 
Indirect taxes   
    tax-to-income  0.999 0.664 
    base-to-income  1.032 0.784 
    tax-to-base  0.989 0.674 
Overall tax system – tax-to-income 0.645 0.545 
 
Notes: Pre-reform refers to the period between 1988/89-1995/96. During this period, no major reforms of the tax system had taken place 
apart from the establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority. Post-reform period refers to the period between 1996/97-2003/04, when 
major tax reforms were implemented. Indirect taxes include Import duties, excise duties and VAT/sales tax. 
 
 
 Elasticity estimates for pre-reform period 
 
Table 1 reveals an inelastic response of the overall tax revenue to changes in income, 
prior to, and after the major reforms. It is reflected in tax-to-income elasticity coefficients 
of 0.645 and 0.545 for the pre – and post-reform period, respectively. The low tax-to-
income elasticity of the overall tax revenue in the pre-reform period is explained by the 
low tax-to-base elasticity of direct and indirect taxes, which signifies a big proportion of 
untaxed or uncollected revenues in the early 1990s (especially considering the wide gap 
between the base-to-income and tax-to-base elasticity of direct taxes).  
 
Prior to the major reforms, revenue yields attributed to import duties and sales tax (Table 
2) were elastic, while the yield of direct taxes and excise duties were inelastic. Import 
duties had the highest tax-to-income elasticity coefficient (1.256) while excise duties and 
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direct taxes had the lowest coefficients (0.705 and 0.706, respectively). The low tax-to-
income elasticity of direct taxes was due to the low tax-to-base elasticity of direct taxes, 
during the pre-reform period. This was caused by informal sector activities that were not 
captured by the tax system, exemptions, and illegal business operations that by-passed the 
tax-net.  The low tax-to-income elasticity of excise duties was the product of low tax-to-
base and base to income elasticity coefficients. However, revenue from import duties and 
sales tax responded favorably to changes in GDP partly because of the introduction of 
10% import duty on agricultural inputs (except fertilizers, pesticides and seed) and all 
raw materials (in 1993/94); raising all zero-rated import duties to 10% (in 1988/89) and 
abolishing duty free imports; and introduction of sales tax on all zero-rated and exempt 
products (in 1989/90).  
Table 2. Summary of elasticity: import and excise duties, and VAT/sales tax  
  Elasticity indexes 
Import duties Pre-reform Post-reform 
    tax-to-income  1.256 0.382 
    base-to-income  1.166 0.638 
    tax-to-base  1.066 0.244 
Excise duties   
    tax-to-income  0.705 0.304 
    base-to-income  0.965 0.857 
    tax-to-base  0.830 0.325 
VAT/sales tax   
    tax-to-income  1.037 1.306 
    base-to-income  0.965 0.857 
    tax-to-base  1.073 1.452 
  
 
 Elasticity estimates for post-reform period 
 
Elasticity of the overall tax system deteriorated slightly after the reform (Table 1). 
Results also show that, only direct taxes and VAT have elasticity of more than one (2.082 
and 1.306, respectively) after the major reforms. The inelastic response of the overall tax 
revenue is explained by poor performance of indirect taxes (the decline in the tax-to-
income elasticity, particularly of import duties). Direct taxes performed well because of 
the favorable response of the tax base to changes in income and the significant increase in 
the tax-to-base elasticity due to improvement in revenue administration and reduction in 
discretionary tax exemptions. VAT also performed well mainly because of the 
responsiveness of VAT revenue to changes in the tax base (private consumption). 
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However, the low base-to-income elasticity of VAT (0.857) reflects low responsiveness 
of private final consumption to growth in national income (GDP).  
 
The elastic revenue yield for direct taxes and VAT means that the tax policies that 
Uganda Government implemented between 1996/97 and 2003/04 were effective, 
especially in increasing the responsiveness of these taxes to changes in national income. 
However, the huge gap between tax-to-base and base-to-income elasticity indexes of 
direct taxes portrays potential revenues in the public hands not being taxed. This could 
mean that there is substantial portion of wages/salaries and incomes in the private sector 
that is still not captured by the tax system or simply uncollected, including informal 
sector activity, illegal business operations, and exemptions. The low response of excise 
revenue to changes in private final consumption and import duties to changes in imports 
(c.i.f value) portrays loss of revenue from these sources. However, the demand for 
alcoholic beverages and cigarettes frequently rises less quickly than income (GDP), and 
so excise revenue is likely to be less elastic.  
 
The low response of the imports revenue to changes in the tax base suggests an increase 
in tax evasion; the growth in value/proportion of imports that are exempted from import 
duties; decline in growth of the real value of imports especially fuel imports (tax rate on 
fuel remained specific, constant, and unadjusted for inflation for over four years – after 
1996/97) and decline in duty revenue from raw materials imports (10% import duty on 
selected raw materials were waived off in 2001/02).  
 
 Comparison between pre and post-reform period 
 
The major reforms implemented after June 1996 brought a positive change in revenue 
yield of direct taxes and VAT. Reforms improved revenue yield of direct taxes from an 
index of 0.706 (pre-reform) to and index of 2.082 (post-reform). This growth is explained 
by increased response of the tax base to changes in GDP (from an index of 1.479 to 
2.021) brought about by increase in wage rates particularly in the civil service following 
the recent pay-reform in civil service, and reduction in tax exemptions after the 
enactment of the new Income Tax Act in 1997. The abolition of tax holidays as well as 
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clarification of taxation of benefits in kind as part of the income tax (law) reforms helped 
improve the tax base and increase revenues from corporate and personal income taxes.  
 
Tax reforms also improved the tax-to-income elasticity of VAT/sales tax from 1.037 to 
1.306 (Table 2). The improvement was small because of the number of VAT exemptions, 
including exemption of VAT on hotel accommodation in 2001/02. Though VAT revenue 
rose more quickly to changes in the tax base, only a small change occurred after the 
reform because of the same problem. The capacity of the VAT to raise more revenue is 
further constrained by the sluggish growth of the tax base in relation to GDP (this 
deteriorated slightly after the reform), a situation which the authority may not have direct 
influence.  
   
Revenue yields (tax-to-income elasticity) of import duties declined during the reforms 
period - from elasticity index of 1.256 to 0.382 (Table 2). This is explained by the drastic 
decline in response of the tax revenue to changes in the tax base (from 1.066 to 0.244) – 
attributed to the factors discussed in earlier paragraphs. It generally undermined the 
response of overall tax system and impact of the reforms implemented by government.  
 
Revenue response to changing economic trends  
 
Analysis of the effect of key macroeconomic variables on revenue suggests that high 
level of development aid can be a source of disincentive to making full use of domestic 
resources for revenue generation. This is reflected in an inverse relationship between 
income tax/overall tax revenue and external grant (the coefficients on external grant are 
negative and significant for income tax and the overall tax equation i.e. estimated at 
0.0041 and 0.057, respectively). 
 
Results also reveal that lower budget deficit reduces effort to collect revenue, particularly 
income tax. However with inverse relationship between import revenue and budget 
deficit (negative coefficient of 0.272), the assumption that increasing fiscal deficit would 
increase effort to collect more revenue through increased import duties may not hold in 
certain circumstances. Increase in import revenue is found to be associated with increase 
in the shillings/US$ ratio i.e. depreciation of Uganda shilling.  
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The OLS results (with import volume as dependent variable) reveal a positive link 
between exchange rate depreciation and volumes of import (coefficient is 3.393) – 
contrary to the assumption that depreciation discourages imports. Depreciation also 
appears to be positively related to import prices (shown by the coefficient of 0.209). The 
regression coefficient suggests a weak link between income tax revenue and changes in 
inflation, but there appears to be a relatively strong relationship between income tax 
revenue and literacy rate. 
 
Conclusions  
  
Empirical results suggest that tax reforms had a positive impact on direct taxes and 
VAT/sales tax as evidence by increase in tax-to-income elasticity from 0.706 to 2.082 
and 1.037 to 1.306 respectively. The yield of import duties deteriorated after the reform 
as shown by a decline in tax-to-income elasticity index: from 1.256 (pre-reform) to 0.382 
(post-reform).  The major reason for this is the increase in tax evasion; and decline in real 
value of imports especially fuel imports due to non adjustment of tax rate for inflation for 
over four years (petroleum products contribute 2% revenue/GDP and over 65% of import 
duty revenue); growth in value of imports exempted from import duty; and the waiving of 
10% import duty on selected raw materials in 2001/02 - affected the tax base.  
 
Reforms had a bigger impact on direct taxes than on indirect taxes, suggesting that tax 
evasion is still a major problem for indirect taxes especially import duties. The sluggish 
response of the imports revenue to changes in the tax base (i.e. the low tax-to-base 
elasticity coefficient of 0.244) suggests serious problem of tax evasion, and other factors 
mentioned above. The improved performance of direct taxes can be explained by the 
introduction of the Income Act 1997 and subsequent measures which reduced loopholes 
in the tax system and avenues for corruption, reduction in discretionary exemptions, and 
simplification of tax procedures and payments of taxes through commercial banks.  
 
Direct taxes and the VAT are key potential growth areas for revenue mobilization, and 
therefore, key areas to rely on for raising future revenues. The huge gap between tax-to-
base and base-to-income elasticity indexes is a sign of potential revenues, which are 
currently untaxed. It shows that room for further improvement in revenue for direct taxes 
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exists. This can be achieved by abolishing some of the exemptions (e.g. on Treasury Bills 
and Bank of Uganda Bills, and salaries of employees of police and prison service – met 
by raising their salaries); improving administrative efficiency of URA and strengthening 
its capacity to register more eligible taxpayers into the tax net. 
   
Reforms had nearly neutral impact on excise duties. This is not surprising because the 
demand for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes frequently rises less quickly than income 
(GDP). So, excise revenue is likely to be less elastic even after reforms. Nevertheless, 
excise duty can be a potential source of future revenue growth by improving compliance 
(the high base-to-income elasticity compared with the tax-to-base elasticity index is an 
indication that some taxes are not being collected), and widening the base by including 
more items into the tax net e.g. imposing high excise duty on plastic shoes.  
 
Finally, the results for the regression analysis on the response of tax revenue (with 
reference to income tax and import duty) to changing economic trend imply that external 
aid, fiscal deficit and changes in exchange rate have significant influence on tax revenue. 
Clearly, Uganda needs to significantly improve its revenue performance and reduce its 
relative reliance on foreign aid. This will require a major improvement in tax 
administration, including tackling the problem of unemployment, and corruption in the 
tax system and the economy as a whole.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the nexus of population pressure, growing fiscal deficit, and 
unsustainable debt management coupled with the challenges of globalization and 
HIV/AIDS, threatens a downward spiral of increasing poverty unless effective strategies 
to reverse the spiral are identified and implemented. In Uganda, government has (since 
1987) initiated a sequence of tax reforms to address the fiscal challenges facing the 
country. This study provides empirical insights into the performance of these reforms in 
terms of raising the revenue mobilization capacity of the tax system. This kind of 
information is crucial for formulating policy to improve the tax revenue effort by 
providing evidence about what measures are most or least effective in raising revenue.   
 
This country case study is part of an international research project on macroeconomic 
policy challenges of low income countries organized by the Global Development 
Network (GDN). Specifically, the study aims to document challenges of domestic 
revenue mobilization in Uganda that can offer policy lessons for low income economies. 
   
The challenge of domestic revenue mobilization carries important policy implications for 
Uganda because the growth in domestic revenue after the various tax reforms (initiated 
since 1987) has scarcely kept pace with the growth of the economy especially the 
growing expenditure demands. It is not clear why revenue has not improved significantly 
despite the wide reaching tax reforms implemented. While effort to increase revenue is 
recognized (Mahler et al 2000; Zaake, 2000), concrete ideas on what measures are most 
effective remain scarce.  Available studies in Sub-Saharan Africa have focused on 
countries like Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, and Tanzania. Past studies in Uganda (e.g. 
Mutambi 2004; World Bank, 2003; Mahler et al 2000) were more concerned with 
discretionary tax measures, macroeconomic policies, tax administration and the Customs 
Union. There are many policy questions that are not tackled by these studies.  
 
This study seeks to address some of these questions. For instance, has Uganda’s tax 
reform effort enhanced revenue mobilization capacity of the tax system? If so, which 
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components of the tax structure or categories of taxes have been most responsive? If not, 
which categories of taxes have been the least responsive, and why? Other countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have much larger ratios of tax revenue to GDP than Uganda. What 
differences in the structure of the tax system seemingly account for this difference?  
 
What is the optimal mix of direct versus indirect taxes?1 The World Bank (1997, page53) 
noted that ‘poor countries, weak in tax administration, are better able to apply indirect 
rather than direct taxes …’ It is also argued that when there is a rapid and significant 
change in macroeconomic policies, it is much more difficult for tax reforms to have 
important and identifiable revenue effects (Tanzi,1988). If this is true, how is revenue 
effort affected by macroeconomic (policy) environment? What lessons do the outcomes 
have for policy makers in Uganda and elsewhere?  
 
The insights gained from this research can enrich the existing knowledge and 
understanding of the challenges of domestic revenue mobilization in low income 
countries. It is hypothesized that: (i) the tax reforms have increased the revenue 
mobilization capacity of the tax system but the administrative structure is not strong 
enough to deliver effective outcomes; (ii) during the pre-reform period, the overall tax 
system was inelastic with respect to GDP and the most contributor to the overall elasticity 
was sales tax; (iii) the reforms had different impacts on different taxes. The most elastic 
taxes after reforms are the direct taxes (attributed to relative effectiveness of the reforms 
in direct taxes) and the lowest are indirect taxes; (iv) VAT has the lowest tax-to-base 
elasticity in individual tax handles; and (v) changes in macroeconomic variables had a 
negative net effect on tax revenue.  
 
Finally, it is hoped that this research can offer an opportunity to discuss theoretical and 
empirical insights, to identify vital areas for new inquiry and to establish contacts with 
those having similar interests. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
focuses on the fiscal operations and the tax reforms.  Methodological issues are outlined 
in section three. Section four looks at the way tax revenue has responded to changes in 
income in the pre – and post-reform periods. Section five focuses on the tax responses to 
changing economic trends, and the paper ends with conclusions in section six.   
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2. Fiscal Operations and Tax Reforms 
 
 
The fiscal policy of Uganda Government focuses on stimulating economic growth, 
strengthening tax administration and raising tax revenue. Ultimately, government aims at 
reducing fiscal deficit in relation to GDP, which is often financed by foreign inflows in 
terms of budget support. This section demonstrates that wide deficits persist because the 
growth in domestic revenue has constantly lagged behind government expenditures.  
2.1 Aggregate level of government spending and the budget deficit 
One of the greatest difficulties facing the Government is that, the revenue outturn has 
hardly kept pace with the growth of the economy especially the growing expenditure 
demands (Table 3). For instance, between 1997/98 and 2003/04 government expenditure 
rose by about 7 percent point of GDP while total revenue (including grants) rose by 1.9 
percent point of GDP during the same period. This is reflected in increased budget deficit 
(as a ratio of GDP) from 6.5 percent 1997/98 to 11.5 percent in 2003/2004 (i.e. an 
increase of 5 percentage point of GDP in the last six years). 
 
Table 3. Uganda: Government revenues and expenditures, 1997/98-2003/04 
 1997/98 
1997/98 
1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
 Expenditures in billions Uganda shillings 
Total revenue & grants 1198.6 1357.7 1576.9 1867.9 1968.1 2251.2 2935.2 
     Recurrent revenue 800.9 950.7 1010.3 1083.5 1253.6 1433.6 1659.0 
    Grants 397.7 407.0 566.6 784.5 714.6 817.6 1276.2 
Total expenditure  1292.2 1589.9 1989.9 2098.4 2514.9 2721.0 3166.8 
Deficit (incl. grants) -93.6 -232.2 -413.0 -230.5 -546.8 -469.8 -231.5 
Deficit (excl. grants) -491.3 -639.2 -979.6 -1015.0 -1261.4 -1287.3 -1507.8 
 Memo items as % of GDP 
Domestic revenue 10.6 11.6 11.2 10.8 12.2 12.1 12.6 
Gov expenditure  17.0 19.4 22.2 21.2 24.4 23.0 24.1 
Deficit (incl. grants) -1.2 -2.8 -4.6 -2.3 -5.3 -4.0 -1.7 
Deficit (excl. grants) -6.5 -7.8 -10.9 -10.1 -12.2 -10.8 -11.5 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development  
 
Based on the current approved budget for 2004/05, a budget deficit of Ushs 1,499.2 
billion is predicted. This deficit may be even larger if additional expenditure in poverty 
reduction programs becomes necessary. The projected deficit taken into conjunction with 
other financing transactions will decrease government cash balance by approximately 
Ushs 437.7 billion. It means future deficits remain substantially large in relation to GDP. 
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The increases in government spending to poverty reduction programs, and the increased 
operational costs of districts, together with domestic development expenditures explain 
the increase in the budget deficit, which is partly financed by external borrowing.  
 
Uganda’s NPV-of-debt to GDP remains historically high at about 31 percent, and the 
NPV of debt in relation to exports (estimated at 269% at end of June 2003) is above the 
threshold of 150 percent under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. Further, increase in the sale 
of treasury bills to mop up excess liquidity arising from increased aid-financed public 
spending has led to a substantial rise in the stock of domestic debt to 10 percent of GDP 
in 2003/04, from 1% of GDP in the late 1990s. Grant financing of the government budget 
also rose from 5.3% of GDP in 1997/98 to about 9.5% in 2003/04. Despite these external 
inflows, substantial proportion of the budget still remains uncovered.  
 
These high levels of fiscal deficits have the potential to stifle economic growth and 
impinge on other macroeconomic aggregates (Broadway et al., 1994). They also tend to 
subject the government’s budget to foreign policies and political pressures. Government 
is aware that such kind of vulnerability does not reflect well on the prudence of the fiscal 
policy but it indicates that the situation may prevail for some time. This makes the case 
for increasing domestic revenue more compelling. Fortunately, this has been one of the 
major objectives of the Ministry of Finance since the 1990s. In 2000, the ministry revised 
the target to increase tax revenue to GDP ratio by half a percentage point annually, after 
failing to achieve the earlier target of one percentage point.  
 
2.2 Uganda’s tax effort  
The amount of revenue collected from different types of taxes and the relative importance 
of the various taxes are presented in Table A2.1. From a historical performance of 12.6 
percent of GDP in 1970-71, revenue from tax declined to a dismal 6.5 percent in 1989/90. 
However, revenue performance improved between 1991/92 and 1996/97, to a tax/GDP 
ratio of 12.2 percent in 1996/97. This remarkable growth in tax revenue was a result of 
policy measures that included restructuring the tax system/administration, particularly the 
establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991, the introduction of the 
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value-added tax (VAT) in 1996 and the introduction of the new Income Act in 1997. 
Other factors that contributed to this growth include restructuring of the tariff regime, 
increase in the rates of excise duty on the traditional excisable products (beer, sodas, 
cigarettes, and spirits) and reductions in discretionary tax exemptions and incentives as 
well as growth of the economy especially the more easily taxable urban and commercial 
sectors. 
 
However, this improvement was short lived as revenue performance began to stagnate in 
1997/98 (Figure 1). At the current ratio of 12.6 percent of GDP (FY2003/04), Uganda’s 
tax effort remains low by the standards of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that on 
average collect about 23 percent of GDP in revenues (not in the figure).   
 
Figure 1. Tax Revenue as % of GDP 1997-2004
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Sources: Ministry of Finance (Uganda), Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Ministry of Finance (Tanzania), Reserve Bank of Malawi, Bank of 
Mauritius, Bank of Namibia, Bank of Rwanda, and B.R.B et Ministère des Finances (Burundi).   
 
Uganda’s tax effort (as measured by the ratio of tax revenue to GDP) is about the same 
level as Rwanda’s and Tanzania’s, but much lower than that of Malawi (15.9%), Burundi 
Ghana (17.2), (17.4%), Zambia (19.4%), Mauritius (19.6%), Kenya (21.2%), and 
Namibia (31%), among other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with similar tax structure.  
 
Apart from having low ratio of tax revenue to GDP, Uganda’s reliance on international 
trade taxes remains much higher, relative to other countries in the region (Figure 2). 
 
  
   
 6 
Among the trends revealed by Figure 2 is the gradual decline in reliance on international 
trade taxes in all the countries. 
  
Figure 2. Taxes on International  Trade as % of Total Tax Revenue
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Source: Ministry of Finance (Uganda), Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Ministry of Finance (Tanzania), Bank of Namibia, Bank of Rwanda.  
Note:  International trade taxes include petroleum duty, and other import duty, excise on imports, VAT on imports, withholding taxes on 
imports, temporary road licenses, commission on imports, re-export levy and hides and skins levy – for the case of Uganda. Similar 
definition is used for other countries where data is available for comparative purpose. 
 
While international trade taxes presently account for less than 30 percent of government 
revenues in most countries, they remain above 50 percent in Uganda. Other countries 
have substantially increased indirect taxes on goods and services to compensate for the 
decline in international trade taxes. Uganda instead shows high reliance on international 
trade and relatively low reliance on indirect taxes on goods and services (Figure 3).2  
 
Figure 3. Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services as % of Total 
Tax Revenue
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Source: Ministry of Finance (Uganda), Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Bank of Rwanda.  
Note:  Domestic/indirect taxes include VAT and excise duty (on domestic goods and services). 
 
 
  
   
 7 
When administrative capabilities are lacking, trade taxes become an attractive alternative 
(Linn, 1990). Although Uganda has increased its reliance on direct taxes on income and 
profits (from 13.2% of total revenue in 1997/98 to about 24% in 2003/04) it is still below 
those found in most low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the upper middle 
income countries (e.g. Kenya 32.7%, Namibia 34.9%, Rwanda 31%, Zambia 33% and 
Singapore 53.7%). 
 
We now turn to the question – why other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have much 
larger ratios of tax revenue to GDP than Uganda. What differences in the structure of the 
tax system seemingly account for this difference? 
 
The structure of the tax system in Uganda is similar to other countries in terms of the 
types of taxes and rates. Areas of potential differences seem to be the differences in the 
rates and base of excise tax, and level of exemptions. Excise taxes in Uganda are levied at 
high rates (higher than many countries) on a narrow base (over 80% of the excise revenue 
is collected from domestic production of three items: beer, cigarettes, and soft drinks). 
Uganda has a wide range of zero-rated and exempt goods (under VAT and Customs).  
Threshold income for being registered for VAT in Uganda (i.e. annual turnover of about 
US$ 27,000) is much lower than Kenya ($47,000), Botswana ($50,000), Lesotho 
($39,000), Ghana ($75,000), Mauritius ($71,400), and South Africa ($40,000). Low 
threshold can present compliance problem. Ministerial discretion in customs and excise 
taxes is still prevalent, though far less than in previous years.  
  
Current exemption for salaries of members of the armed forces, the police and prison 
service and income earned by expatriate staff, interest on treasury bills and central bank 
bills, and other related exemptions have the potential to narrow the tax base, and reduce 
its productivity. Uganda relies on PAYE for direct taxation; most of the taxes are less 
developed. Property tax, taxes on land and real estate, and financial transactions which 
are important revenue base for Mauritius (i.e. contributing 6%, 1.5% and 4.5% of total 
tax revenue in Mauritius, respectively) are not yet developed in Uganda.  
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The other reasons for the low tax share in GDP (perhaps more important than the ones 
mentioned above) are that Uganda has a substantial part of the value added in national 
income accounted for by the agricultural sector. In Table 4, the value-added from 
agriculture accounts for nearly 40 percent of GDP in Uganda compared to less than 20 
percent in Kenya, 6 percent in Mauritius, 11 percent in Namibia, 2 percent in Botswana, 
and 16 percent average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda agriculture comprises small 
landholdings that usually serve only subsistence objectives. 
 
Table 4. Economic Indicators for selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 
Population 
2001  
Per Capita 
GDP 2002  
GDP Growth 
(2000-01)  
Structure of Output (2001) 
Illiteracy 
rate (2001) 
Poverty 
1984-
2000* Agric. Indust. Service 
 Million (US$) Percent % GDP % GDP % GDP %of pop  % pop 
Uganda 23 236 4.6 36 21 43 32 *55 
Kenya 31 393 1.1 19 18 63 17 42 
Tanzania 34 267 5.7 45 16 39 24 42 
Rwanda 9 212 6.7 40 22 38 32  51 
Namibia 2 1,463 2.7 11 33 56 17 .. 
Mauritius 1 3,740 7.2 6 31 62 15 11 
Botswana 2 3,080 6.3 2 47 51 22 .. 
Zambia 10 361 4.9 22 26 52 21 73 
Memo items         
Sub-S Africa 674 469 2.9 16 28 56 37 .. 
Low Income Countries 2,506 451 4.7  24 32 45 .. .. 
World 6,130 5,174 1.1 4 30 66 .. .. 
 
Source: The World Bank (2003): World Development Indicators; and African Development Indicators; UNDP (2004) Human Development 
Report 2004. Notes: Value added is the value of the gross output of producers less the value of intermediate goods and services 
consumed in production, before taking account of the consumption of fixed capital in the production process (World Bank, 2003). Industry 
comprises mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas (International Standard Industrial Classification - ISIC div10-45) 
* National poverty head count = percentage of population 15 years of age and above that is illiterate. According to 2003 household survey, 
poverty level in Uganda is estimated at 38%.  
  
Agriculture sector dominance is reflected in the degree of monetization; Uganda’s 
monetized economy is estimated at 70% (Kenya’s is 82%) of total GDP (not included in 
the table). This portrays large informal activities that are not captured by the tax system, 
and is aggravated by high incidence of poverty (the 2003 survey indicates that 38% of the 
population live below the poverty line).  
 
Potential revenue sources such as industries, services and mining constitute a small 
proportion of Uganda’s GDP compared to other countries (Table 4). The value-added 
from industries accounts for 47% of GDP in Botswana (with mining alone accounting for 
about 35% of GDP according to Bank of Botswana 2004 report); over 30% in Mauritius 
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and Namibia, and 26% in Zambia. Uganda’s service sector (comprising 43% of GDP) is 
also among the smallest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is below the SSA average.  
 
Uganda’s per capita income/GDP is also one of the lowest in SSA. Tanzi (1987) findings 
(on review of tax systems in developing countries) reveal a positive relationship between 
per capita income and total tax revenue, and income taxes. It is argued that as countries 
develop, tax bases tend to develop more than proportionately to the growth in income. It 
is also generally argued that as income grows, countries become more urbanized. 
Urbanization is assumed to bring about a greater demand for public services while at the 
same time facilitating tax collection (Tanzi, 1987). 
 
While these economic factors are recognized, it should be noted that corruption and tax 
evasion is a serious problem in Uganda. Tax administration is weak. Occasional political 
influence is a problem too. These, combined with inadequate facilitation and low staff 
morale, weaken tax collection efficiency. Of course, it should not be forgotten that 
Uganda has experienced political instability involving civil wars in the past decades, 
which has negative impact on revenue collection.3 
 
The persistent low tax to GDP prompted Uganda Government to reform the tax system. 
The tax reforms mirror the general characteristics of the reforms implemented in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the past decade. They were part of a wider macroeconomic reform 
program of the 1980s-1990s that were implemented with a view to setting these countries 
on a path of economic growth through increased productivity and efficiency. 
  
2.3 Major tax reforms in Uganda 
 
The major reform measures included: reforming tax administration, introduction of VAT 
to broaden the tax base; simplifying the tax structure and broadening the bases for 
personal and corporate income taxes set at lower rates; reduction of import duties and 
simplification of the rate structure; and abolition of export-related taxes. The tax laws 
were therefore, amended and some repealed with the view to aligning them with the best 
practice.4 
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 Administrative Reforms 
 
The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was set up in September 1991 as an autonomous 
agency to collect taxes. Prior to this, three separate departments in the Ministry of 
Finance: Customs and Excise Department, Inland Revenue and the Income Tax 
Departments, collected taxes for government.  
   
URA was expected to improve revenue collection through enhanced autonomy, 
acquisition of skilled staff, increased integrity and effective use of automated system. The 
authority was expected to adopt private sector-style management practices in its 
administration, with competitive staff remuneration, high caliber staff and adopt a code of 
conduct to guard against corruption. All these measures were expected to result in 
sustainable increase in revenue collection, and to achieve a tax to GDP ratio comparable 
to countries such as Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and Singapore. 
  
URA introduced measures aimed at increasing taxpayer compliance. These included 
taxpayer education and tax advice facilities, and the Tax Identification Number (TIN) to 
reduce the time taxpayers spent fulfilling their tax obligations. The Large Tax Payers 
Department (LTD) was set up in 1998 to offer corporate service on all domestic taxes to 
the top 100 tax payers and their subsidiaries. The Tax Appeals Tribunal (TAT) was also 
introduced in August 1998 to provide an independent mechanism to which taxpayers who 
are aggrieved by URA actions can go for redress.5    
 
Other measures included computerization of the Income Tax Department in 1994; 
automation of URA operation using ASYCUDA system in Customs and the VENUS 
system in the VAT department (1996) – for recording revenues and tracking receipts; 
merging the department of VAT and Internal Revenue in April 2000 to create a one-stop 
centre of internal revenue for the medium and small taxpayers. In addition, URA 
instituted tax investigation mechanisms to ensure greater accountability on the part of 
revenue collectors and to strengthen the procedures for investigating allegations of 
corruption. A special para-military unit (the Anti-smuggling Protection Unit) was 
established to augment the efforts of the URA to crack down smuggling and tax evasion. 
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The Special Revenue Protection Service is deployed in all the revenue collection 
departments of the URA to curb tax malpractices. 
  
Value Added Tax (VAT) 
 
Another major reform was the introduction of VAT in 1996 (at 17% for most goods) to 
replace sales tax (which was charged at 12% - 30%) and taxes on services called 
commercial transaction levy (CTL). VAT was introduced on the ground that it had a 
higher revenue potential compared to the sales tax. It was also considered to be a fairer 
tax than sales tax because it can reduce or eliminate the cascading effect (paying tax upon 
tax) of sales tax. The other strength of VAT over sales tax is the existence of an audit trail 
that could be used to verify VAT amounts declared under the VAT system.6  
  
Prior to introduction of the VAT, most of the changes to the tax system in the 1990s seem 
to have been concerned more with raising revenue than equity, and relied greatly on 
ministerial discretion. Examples of these are the introduction of sales tax on all zero rated 
and exempt products in 1989/90 and the removal in 1993/94 of all exemptions from tax 
except those under bilateral agreements with foreign countries and accredited 
international institutions (those granted to investors under the Investment Code except for 
construction materials were retained). Over the years, Uganda has witnessed a distinct 
move away from ministerial discretion in tax policy (exemptions). The VAT law of 1996 
prohibited the granting of exemptions (discretionary exemptions have reduced).  
 
Under the present VAT, supply of most basic goods and services, which accounts for 
disproportionately high percentage of low-income household spending are exempted or 
zero-rated e.g. basic foodstuffs. In addition to equity concerns, certain sales are exempt or 
zero-rated for general development reasons e.g. educational and health services and 
passenger transport services. Generally, a number of VAT exemptions appear pro-poor.  
 
Exemption of public passenger transport is progressive because public transport is 
usually the mode of transport for the poor. The same with food, as it has been known 
since the time Engel coined his famous law (Engel’s Law), the poor tend to spend more 
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of their budget on food than do the rich. It can also be argued that the exemption gives a 
greater tax relief to the better off than the poor because the actual amount spent by the 
rich on food is more than the amount spent by the poor. Rich people tend to buy more 
expensive varieties of food and may throw food away more easily. 
  
Preferential treatment to educational services on ground of equity needs careful 
justification. In 2001, the ratio of pupils enrolled in private primary schools as a 
percentage total primary enrolment in Uganda was only 13% compared to 87% in 
government-aided schools (Bategeka, Ayoki and Mukungu, 2004). Private education is 
expensive, and has wide usage in urban areas and is usually bought by the better off. 
Public education under the Universal Primary Education (UPE) is basically free.  
 
Preferential treatment to drugs and medicines and medical services is likely to increase 
the regressivity of the VAT, and can easily be abused.  The same applies to dental, 
nursing and social welfare. Much of the justifications for the consumption of such goods 
and services relating to infant mortality, the control of communicable diseases, and 
disease-prevention are appropriate. However, there is no convincing evidence that the 
private sector is important in these functions (like in education) or the poor are using the 
service provided by the private sector. Instead, the main beneficiaries of the tax relief are 
the better off who spends more on medicines and medical services and who can afford to 
pay for services at private health facilities.  
 
Drugs and medicines, and medical services are provided free or at nominal cost under the 
public health services, but are charged high price at private facilities. Equity may not be 
severely affected by abolishing tax-relief to sales of drugs and medicines, and medical 
services and achieve the redistribution objective through the expenditure side of the 
budget, albeit with its own challenges.   
 
VAT relief for agricultural outputs and inputs cannot be fully justified by reference to 
equity. For instance, domestically produced cereals especially wheat and rice are not part 
of the basic diet of the poor. And since the small producers and traders who are 
effectively exempt from the VAT by the threshold generate a high proportion of the 
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value-added in the production and distribution of domestically consumed food, extending 
VAT to agricultural output would not hurt the poor.  
 
The list of VAT exemptions needs to be reassessed and kept to a minimum to broaden the 
tax base and to facilitate compliance by taxpayers and control by tax administration. The 
zero rates should be applied exclusively to exports (and items required by international 
convention). Extending zero rates to many sectors result in more difficult control systems 
and an increased number of refund claims, which sometimes cannot be managed by the 
tax administration.   
  
Income Tax   
 
With respect to direct taxes, reforms aimed at reducing overall complexity of the tax 
structure by ensuring that each of the sources of personal incomes are similarly taxed and 
that those in the less formal sector are brought into the tax net by use of  a presumptive 
tax to ensure equity payment between all sources of income.  
 
The Income Tax Decree of 1974 allowed considerable discretion to the minister to 
declare any class of income to be exempt from tax. This loophole was eliminated by the 
new Income Tax Act of 1997. The new Income Tax Act aimed at broadening the 
definition of taxable income (among other things).7 It abolished discretionary exemptions 
and tax holidays, and reduced the personal income tax rates to four main bands (0%, 
10%, 20% and 30%).  
 
Setting an annual threshold income subject to income tax at Ush 1,560,000 (approx. US$ 
900 or over 3 times per capita income), the poor are, by definition, ‘exempted’ from 
personal income tax. Otherwise the main exemptions include pensions; salaries (official 
employment income) of employee of the Armed Forces (of Uganda), the Police Force, 
and the Prison Service; interest payable on Treasury Bills or Bank of Uganda Bills; 
bequests and gifts not arising from a business relationship; charitable donations; non-
business capital gains; and income exempt under normal international convention.  
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Exemptions of pensions, charitable donations, bequests and gifts, and items required 
under international convention are normal and support equity. However, the reason for 
exempting Treasury Bills and Bank of Uganda Bills; and salaries of employees of the 
armed forces, police and prison service is difficult to discern. Removal of exemption on 
Treasury Bills and Bank of Uganda Bills would reduce possible distortion in the capital 
market likely to hinder financing of private capital formation. Raising salaries of 
employees of the armed forces, police and prison service to enable them pay taxes (i.e. to 
retain the same after-tax-income) is preferred to outright exemption. It improves 
transparency of the tax system and fairness in relation to other PAYE taxpayers.   
 
Import Duty 
 
The current tariffs in Uganda are based on the Harmonized Code (HS) - having changed 
it from the SITC system in 1995/96. Customs tariff reform have involved (among others) 
reduction in tariff rates, simplification of the structure, reduction of exemptions and 
phasing out import bans, import license requirements and pre-shipment inspection (Table 
A4.4). The myriad tax rates charged on international trade (imports) have been reduced to 
three standard rates: 0%, 7% and 15%.  
 
Plant and machinery is zero-rated, while raw materials and final goods from non-
COMESA countries are subject to a 7 percent and a 15 percent duty, respectively. Rates 
for similar goods originating from COMESA countries are 0%, 4% and 6%. To 
compensate for the reduction in tariff, government introduced excises of 10% on the 
imports (applied on an ad valorem basis across about 400 tariff lines). The excise was 
meant to protect domestic producers against imports from COMESA countries. 
Meanwhile, import bans on cigarettes, beer, sodas, and car batteries were removed in 
1998/99, and replaced by temporary import surcharge.   
 
In 1995/96, Government amended Section 22 of the 1991 Investment Code to abolish the 
granting of discretionary exemptions on import duties (and all other taxes) payable on 
imported plant and machinery for investors licensed by Uganda Investment Authority. 
Consequently, the tax system became more transparent, easier to administer and has 
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contributed to an increase in the revenue yield. However, Section 4 of the Customs Tariff 
Act of 1970 allows for the minister to remit duty, in whole or in part. Frequently, these 
statutory instruments are used to benefit specific industries in response to lobbying. 
 
Most of these statutory instruments have the flexibility to allow raw materials for specific 
industries to be imported at preferential rates, for instance, remitting the customs duty 
payable from 15 percent to 7 percent (and/or remitting any excise on imports). The 
preferential treatment tends to target goods with high degrees of protection such as textile 
and sugar. In the case of sugar, the industry benefits simultaneously from high duties on 
sugar imports (15%), and preferential access to imported sugar as a raw material for other 
production (beer and soft drinks). The textile industry benefits from the high duties on 
textile imports (15 percent ad valorem tariff, plus a 10 percent excise or a specific duty of 
US$0.19 per meter, whichever provides greater protection). Presently, the domestic 
market price of sugar in Uganda exceeds US$600 per ton (much higher than the cost of 
sugar on world markets) – thus imposing a burden on the consumers, including the poor.  
 
The preferential treatment accorded to domestic textile industry, in away, also denies 
consumers, including the poor access to better and cheaper imported clothing. An 
important case is the taxing of used clothing. The importation of used clothing is subject 
to a 15% import duty and a 10% excise. Yet, many Ugandans especially the poor cannot 
afford new clothes, whether domestically produced or imported. Extensive tax evasion 
(smuggling) occurs, not only because of weak customs administration and lack of 
effective surveillance and deterrence mechanisms, but also because of such protection. 
Revenue implications of the removal of this protection are likely to be positive.  
 
2.4  Structure of domestic taxes 
  
Domestic Indirect Taxes in Uganda comprise the Custom/Import Duty, Excise Duty, and 
the Value Added Tax. The Direct Taxes consists of the Income Tax. Other revenue items 
include Fees and Licenses, and Non-tax Revenue (Appropriation in Aid). The four major 
taxes: Income Tax, Import Duty, VAT, and Excise Duty are described in reference to 
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their coverage, base characteristics, rate structure, and contribution to revenue, relative to 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Income tax 
 
Income tax accounted for 23.7 percent of Uganda’s total tax revenue in 2003/04 
compared with Malawi (21.6%), Tanzania (29%), Rwanda (28%), Kenya (35%), Zambia 
(33%), and Namibia (34.7%), with similar income tax structure (Table A2.3). Income tax 
comprises Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE), corporate tax, withholding tax, presumptive tax, 
rental income tax, and tax on interest in banks. Of these, PAYE (on formal sector 
employees) is the most important in Uganda, accounting for 11.8 percent of total tax 
revenue, followed by corporate income taxes (7.7%), and withholding taxes (Table A2.1). 
Rental income and tax on interest in banks have nearly the same contribution to total tax 
revenue. Other domestic direct taxes in this category include taxes on casinos and 
lotteries, which account for less than 1percent of total direct taxes.  
 
Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Namibia collect more revenue from personal 
income tax than from corporate taxes. However, the ratio of personal income tax to total 
tax revenue is much lower in Uganda (11.8%) compared with ratios in Tanzania (13%), 
Malawi (16%), Namibia (23%) and Zambia (26%) – Table A2.3. The Ugandan case is an 
indication of potential revenue loss due to a large number of individuals exempted from 
personal income tax including incomes earned by expatriates. In Namibia, income earned 
from work performed in Namibia is taxable in Namibia, regardless of where or by whom 
payment is made. And interest income received by ordinary residents of Namibia, 
regardless of where that interest is earned is taxable in Namibia.  
 
At the moment, the threshold for personal income subject to income tax in Uganda is 
about US$ 900 per year (equivalent to 3.3 times per capita GDP). With this target, over 
70% of employees included in the pay as you earn (PAYE) returns fall below the 
threshold. Tanzania applies income tax threshold of about US$ 570 (approx. 2 times per 
capita GDP) per annum, Malawi about US$ 370 (about 2 times per capita GDP), Rwanda 
US$ 330 (about 1.5 times per capita GDP), and Ethiopia US$ 209 (about 2 times per 
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capita GDP). In Uganda, where PAYE has recorded high revenue yield; it has mainly 
been as a result of increase in wage rates and the elastic nature of the tax rather than the 
expansion of the tax base. Yet, without taxes on property, personal and corporate incomes 
remain the only base of direct taxation in Uganda.  
  
Value Added Tax 
 
The largest share of tax revenue in Uganda originates from Value Added Tax (VAT), 
followed by import duty. The share of VAT in total tax revenue in 2003/04 was 33.8 
percent in Uganda (equivalent to 4.3% of GDP) and 24.4 percent in Mozambique (2.7% 
of GDP), with the same 17% standard rate. On the other hand, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa levy rates lower than Uganda. Yet they have much 
larger ratios of tax revenues to GDP than Uganda (Table 5).  
 
Table 5.  Value- Added-Tax in selected SSA countries, 2003/04 
Country Scope Rates (percent) and Exemptions 
Threshold  
USD '000 
Rev as % of  
Efficiency 
Ratio(%)1 
  Stage(s) 
Tax 
Base Standard  Exemptions8 
Other 
rates  
Total 
Tax GDP 
Botswana R G+S 10 Standard None 50.0 13.2 4.2 42.0 
Ethiopia  R G+S 15 Standard 0 58.1 37.7 4.5 30.0 
Kenya  R G+S 16 Standard 0,14 47.4 28.3 6.0 37.5 
Lesotho R G+S 14 Standard 0 39.6 15.7 6.4 45.7 
Malawi  R G+ST 20 Standard 0  26.4 4.2 21.0 
Mauritius  R G+S 15 Standard, other 10 71.4 36.9 5.6 20.0 
Mozambique  R G+S 17 Standard, other None  24.4 2.7 15.9 
Namibia  R G+S 15 Standard 30 26.4 23.5 7.2 48.0 
Rwanda  R G+S 15 Standard 0 27.7 31.6 3.8 25.3 
South Africa  R G+S 14 Standard 0 40.0 24.0 5.9 42.1 
Tanzania  R G+S 20 Standard, other None 19.2 35.0 4.7 23.5 
Uganda  R G+S 17 Standard 0 27.0 33.8 4.3 25.3 
Zambia  R G+S 17.5 Standard 0 20.8 30.2 5.8 33.1 
              
 
Source:  Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Ministry of Finance (Uganda), Bank of Namibia, Reserve Bank of Malawi.  
Notes:  R = VAT extending through the retail stage, G = Goods, S = Services, ST = Service taxed selectively 
1 The efficiency ratio is defined as the ratio of the share of VAT revenues in GDP to the standard rate (Grandcolas 2004). A 25% 
ratio implies that a 1% point increase in the standard rate is associated with an increase in the share of VAT revenues in GDP 
of about 0.25 percentage point. 
 
Countries with similar VATs (as measured by the standard rate) can have a significantly 
different revenue performance (VAT revenue/GDP). In Mauritius the VAT collects about 
6% of GDP and in Ethiopia and Rwanda less than 4%, all with standard rate of 15%.  
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Uganda’s VAT (same as other countries’ in Table 5), extends through the retail stage and 
includes goods and services in the tax base. The inclusion of the retail stage (with 
exception of small businesses) means that all trading margins are included in taxable 
value. 9 
 
Uganda imposes three VAT rates: a zero rate, exempt and standard rate of 17%. The zero 
rate applies to exports; international transport services; drugs and medicines; educational 
materials; seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and hoes; cereals grown, milled or produced in 
Uganda; and machinery and tools suitable for use only in agriculture. Apparently, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia do the same with 
similar range of foodstuffs. Outside Africa, nine other VAT countries in the world, zero 
rate (basic) foodstuffs.10  
 
The standard exemption (in Uganda) applies to unprocessed food and other agricultural 
products, and livestock; milk and most milk products; excisable petroleum products; feed 
for livestock and poultry; equipment for processing agricultural and dairy products; and 
medical, dental, nursing, social welfare, educational and funeral services. Others include 
passenger transport services (except those provided by tours operators); unimproved land; 
building leases (except for commercial buildings, hotel/holiday accommodation, car-
parking facilities, service apartments and any lease of less than 3 months). Also exempted 
are banking and insurance services; assets sold as part of a going concern; betting; 
postage stamps, and precious metals purchased by the Bank of Uganda; and computers, 
printers, parts and accessories. 
 
VAT (17%) is levied on domestic goods and services, excise duty-inclusive ex-factory 
value of domestically manufactured goods and on the custom duty-inclusive c.i.f value of 
imports. Tanzania imposes VAT on relatively wider range of goods and services, 
including petroleum products; Uganda and Kenya do not levy VAT on petroleum 
products. Botswana levies VAT at a single rate; no relief for the VAT on essential 
products is provided (although the country may use other elements of the tax-and-
expenditure system to help the poor).11  
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The threshold for being registered for VAT in Uganda is an annual turnover of UShs 50 
million (approx. US$ 27,000). The threshold in Kenya is Ksh 3.6 million (approx. US$ 
47,000), in Rwanda RwF 15 million (about US$ 27,700) and in Tanzania Tshs 20 million 
(approx. US$ 19,260). However, Uganda and Rwanda have nearly the same threshold yet 
they differ in their VAT revenue; while Kenya and Mauritius with a wide difference in 
tax thresholds have almost the same tax to GDP ratio (Table 5).  
 
The VAT base in Uganda is generally broader compared to the base of the previous sales 
tax and CTL. However, over 90 percent of VAT revenue in Uganda is still collected from 
a few domestic excisable products (cigarettes, beer and spirits, soft drinks and cellular 
phone services) and less than ten prominent companies. Further, there has been so much 
pressure for special relief in Uganda targeted at the 0% rate. Such relieves narrow the 
VAT base, reduce its revenue productivity, and introduce distortions and inequalities in 
the tax system.  
 
Excise duties  
 
Excise duty contributed 10.5 percent of Uganda’s total tax revenue (1.4% of GDP) in 
2003/2004. This proportion is similar to those found in low-income countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa such as Malawi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania (Table A2.A) and Zambia 
but is substantially lower than those found in Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia and Lesotho 
and in the OECD countries, where excise revenue is over 3 percent of GDP. 
  
Excise duty is applied ex-factory on domestically produced goods, that is, beer, spirit, 
and soft drinks, petroleum products, and cellular phone air time. The same tax equally 
applies on similar imports, except for cellular phone air time. Uganda also charges a 10 
percent excise duty/surcharge on a range of products e.g. motor vehicles and other high 
value imports – for the purpose of raising revenue. Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and 
Ethiopia have basically a similar base for excise revenue as Uganda’s. However, the 
excise tax rates differ significantly across these countries on the main excisable goods 
(Table A2.4). For instance, the specific excise duty rate for gasoline in Uganda is twice as 
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high as that in Tanzania. Retail gasoline prices are higher in Uganda because of the 
relatively high excise duty and the pre-tax price – which reflects higher transportation 
costs to deliver gasoline to Uganda. The high excise duty is an incentive for smuggling.   
 
Uganda and Kenya impose excise duty on petroleum products, while Tanzania charges 
VAT. Use of ad valorem or specific rate also differs. For example, Uganda levies ad 
valorem rates of 130 percent on cigarettes. Instead, Kenya imposes specific rates based 
on average retail price bands. Uganda imposes ad valorem rates on beer while Kenya and 
Tanzania levy specific rates. In addition, Uganda has low rate for local beer while 
Tanzania excise all beers at the same rate. Wine and spirits are charged ad valorem rates 
in Kenya and Uganda, but specific rate in Tanzania. Unlike Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda 
levies a special excise duty or surcharges on a number of imported goods.   
 
Over 80 percent of the excise revenue in 2003/04 was collected from domestic 
production of only three items: beer, cigarettes, and soft drinks, which means, excise 
taxes in Uganda are levied at high rates on a narrow base. Actually, the overall effective 
rate of excise duties averaged 48 percent between 1987 and 1989. The heaviest burden 
fell on beer (214%), cigarettes (215%), and soft drink (70%).  
 
Custom/Import duties 
 
Import duty is levied on the c.i.f value of imports, and is the second largest source of 
government revenue in Uganda. In 2003/04 it contributed 3 percent of GDP representing 
23.8 percent of total tax revenue (Table A2.1). Petroleum products and motor vehicles 
provide over 60 percent of the customs (duty) revenue. Petroleum products alone 
contributed 2 percent to GDP and 66.8 percent of import duty revenue in FY2003/04. The 
significance of petroleum products is mainly because of the high specific tax rates. 
 
With import duty revenue of 23.8 percent of total tax in 2003/04, Uganda shows greater 
reliance on import duty compared to Kenya – with a ratio of 10%, Tanzania 9.5%, 
Botswana 16%, Malawi about 19%, Mauritius about 13%,  and Rwanda 14%. As 
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expected, Uganda has higher ratio of import duty revenue to GDP than, for example, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda and Ethiopia (Table A2.2).  
 
Tariffs may bring in badly needed revenue but they can create imbalances and distortions 
in the economic choices of enterprises, and ultimately reduce welfare. However, Uganda 
is engaged in a process of trade liberalization through regional and bilateral free trade and 
customs union (EAC) agreements, which are likely to limit her ability to increase such 
taxes in future.  
 
The tariff structure in Uganda (is basically ad valorem for most items) - comprises three 
tariff bands: 0%, 10%, and 15%. The zero rate applies to capital goods and some socially 
important imports such as medicines, fertilizers and pesticides. Tanzania applies five 
import duty rates (0%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 30%) while Kenya has nine - ranging from 0-
40%, Rwanda five (0%, 5%, 10%, 15% and 25%) and Ethiopia seven, ranging from 0-
35%. This shows that the import duty structure is much simpler in Uganda than in the 
neighboring countries. 
  
2.5  Revenue corruption  
There are many indications that an increase in revenue corruption has contributed to 
reducing the growth in reported revenues.12  
 
Revenue loss through corruption occurs in many ways, including falsification/forging of 
documents by taxpayers or tax officer to reduce tax liabilities. The Special Revenue 
Protection Service (SRPS) provided us a few examples connected with false-declaration 
of goods or under-declaration of both value and quantities of goods, proceeds and income; 
and of declaring imported goods (finished products) as raw materials. One involved an 
agro company in Kampala that had imported 4,400 tons of Tiger Head Batteries worth 
US$87,296 (in February 2004). The goods were declared as hoes and pangas (agricultural 
implements are exempted). The goods were detected at the railways goods shade in 
Kampala and the tax revenue of USh 54,249,344 (about US$ 30,138) was recovered, plus 
a fine of USh 52,381,004.    
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Sometimes goods are declared as originating from within the COMESA region which has 
lower duty rates in the assessment and application of duties on products. 
Misclassification of products (imports) under tariff codes with lower tariff rates and 
changing of number-plates for vehicles transporting transit goods has also been reported. 
Smuggling goods into the country through panya (unofficial) route (even through the 
customs), sometimes with the knowledge and help of customs officials is also rampant. 
There seems to be high rate of smuggling of petroleum products, cigarettes, sugar, steel, 
leather, wood, textiles, bicycles, and chemicals. Much of the petroleum products and 
cigarettes are smuggled across Lake Victoria. Part of the smuggled cigarettes are 
offloaded in Kampala under the pretext that consignments are export goods and then 
transported to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or sold in Kihihi and Rukungiri, 
Ntungamo, Mbarara, Ishaka and Kasese. Textiles are smuggled across Malaba, while new 
bicycles are brought in as spare parts.  
 
At times, goods are allowed to enter the country without any documentation or with 
documents which indicate an intension to cross the country in transit (or heading for 
Kigali in Rwanda or Kinshasa in the Democratic of Congo), although the goods end up 
being sold in Kampala or other major towns in Uganda. For example, in February 2004 a 
truck: Reg. No. UAD 962J (carrying Saf-Lever Baker’s Yeast valued at US$29,190), 
supposed to travel DRC was found being loaded in Kampala. The concerned trader had to 
pay tax of USh 19,288,362 to URA and additional Ushs 17,060,037 in fine, plus Ush 
5,000,000 extra charge on the truck. Similarly, two trucks: reg. no. KAN 301V/ZB 6512 
and KAN 987K/ZB 5109 that were carrying 2,220 tons of Tiger Head Batteries (valued at 
USh 77,583,153) purportedly heading for the DRC was found offloading goods in 
Kampala. Tax revenue of Ush 33,011,631 was also recovered, on top of a fine of Ush 
23,274,946 and another fine of Ush 10,000,000 on the trucks.    
 
Payment of bribes to tax officials in exchange for a tax reduction for the taxpayer, 
concealment of fraud discovered during audit excises, allowing goods to be released from 
customs control before payment of taxes, etc., have also been cited. For example, in 
October 2004, imported polythene bags and petroleum worth US$42,248.5 was removed 
from customs control using documents of prior consignment. This seems to have been 
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facilitated by some customs official. Fortunately, this was discovered, and the importer 
made to pay a fine of Ush 21,181,668 in addition to the tax of Ush 36,251,857. 
 
Corruption in the tax system is very complex, seemingly well organized, and difficult to 
detect. It is a challenge to authority because corrupt individuals operate in a network. 
When a member of staff of URA is dismissed and joins the private sector, the knowledge 
of the workings of the tax system and inside contacts in URA only strengthens the 
corruption networks. In fact, many clearing firms and tax audit firms in Kampala and 
Entebbe are owned by former URA employees. To defeat the corruption problem would 
require identifying and cracking down these corruption networks.  
 
Corruption is worsened by the (method of past) recruitment in URA, which appeared to 
be influenced by having good connections and less by professional qualifications. 
Moreover, the tax laws are unclear and administrative procedures, including the 
procedures for reporting tax revenues lack transparency and are poorly monitored within 
the tax administration itself and by the office of the Auditor General. Revenue officers 
are considered to have wide discretionary powers to interpret tax laws.13 
  
Government has tried several measures to end corruption. These included privatisation of 
some of the customs operations e.g. verification of imports through pre-shipment 
inspection companies (was tried between 1996 and 1999, only to be abandoned in June 
2000); and automation of customs and VAT operations by introducing ASYCUDA and 
the VENUS system in the customs and the VAT department, respectively (i.e. introduced 
in 1996 though use of forged receipts to release goods in customs has not stopped, even 
with ASYCUDA in place).  
 
Others included enforcement of tax compliance using a special military unit, the Anti-
smuggling Protection Unit, and the Special Revenue Protection Service; recruiting ‘born 
again’ Christians into URA because they were perceived to be more trustworthy; and 
introducing a system of reward (in 1998) i.e. a cash prize of 10% of the face value of tax 
revenue recovered, to any person who volunteers information leading to recovery of tax 
revenue;  as well as dedicating a telephone-hotline and email address for the public to 
report any tax-related malpractices. In addition, taxpayers’ education program and anti-
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corruption efforts through the office of the Inspectorate of Government (IGG) have been 
used to reinforce other measures. Instead, corruption seems to be increasing. In 2002, 
because of public concern, the President appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate 
the alleged corruption in the URA. What happens next, in terms of implementing the 
recommendations of the commission is yet to be seen. 14  
 
Dealing with corruption in the tax system requires a number of measures – including 
building tax compliance and winning public confidence so that people voluntarily comply 
in paying taxes rather than the tax collectors having to demand for taxes. Taxpayers’ 
willingness to pay or not depends on what they perceive they will get in return from 
government in terms of service provision.15 Government budget and action should 
therefore, reflect this. In addition, Government needs to ensure that payments to its service 
providers and suppliers are not over delayed. Discontent with government payments seems 
to increase tax resistance, and may be contributing to the tax evasion by some businesses.  
 
Other measures include making the tax procedures very simple and transparent so that the 
taxpayers know what their obligations are towards revenue collection, as well as educating 
them (taxpayers) on tax laws and collection systems. These ought to be presented in the 
simplest possible way for an average taxpayer to understand (interpretation in major local 
languages could also help). Possibly, ignorance of the tax laws and procedures is partly 
responsible for generating the environment for corruption in the tax system.  
 
In addition, effective use of automated systems (e.g. computerization of the clearing 
system), and improving information flow within and across departments and strengthening 
tax audit are needed to improve tax collection and monitoring system. It would also help in 
evaluating refund claims and in preventing possible frauds associated with these claims. 
Developing an effective mechanism that guarantee the tracking of documentation of goods 
from Mombasa to the final delivery point is also needed in order to cut down on 
falsification of documents by officials at various checkpoints, and to ensure continuous 
monitoring of the tax body.  
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Consideration should also be given to strengthening tax administration including staff 
investigative machinery and human resource management system, particularly system of 
rewarding staff in order to attract skilled and high calibre employees. Employee must feel 
that they actually represent the most valuable asset of the organisation and that top 
management is prepared to invest in their future. So, the issue of retirement benefits (lack 
of which has been cited as one of the causes of stealing) and career development need 
urgent attention. A well designed training program is necessary if capacity of staff is to 
improve.  
 
The point here is that the URA administration must rely on a number of human resource 
management instruments, not only remuneration to be effective and efficient. While 
salary rise may help, it won’t stop revenue officials from taking bribes. Pay level is only 
one of several factors affecting the behaviour of tax officers. In a situation in which the 
demand for corrupt services is extensive and monitoring ineffective, wage increases may 
end up serving as an extra bonus on top of the bribes taken by corrupt officers (Fjeldstad 
and Rakner 2003). Similarly, it is not enough to ‘fire’ corrupt officials without reforming 
aspects of the system that provide opportunities for stealing and ensuring that honest 
officials are being appointed in position of trust. Where personal contact is a problem, the 
introduction of elements of unpredictability as to which particular official may handle a 
matter or certain category of clients, and routine transfers may also help.  
 
Finally, anti-corruption effort in the tax system needs to be extended to embrace other 
efforts towards achieving good governance, rather than being handled in isolation. For 
instance, how transparent is the government procurement system, the awarding of 
government tender, ministerial discretion of providing preferential treatment to some 
industries and companies, and so on? How is the policy environment, for instance, what 
has been done to correct the misalignment in policies which generates an environment for 
corruption such as cross-border differences in the tariffs regime? Some of the smuggling 
activities are reactions to misalignment in the policies of Uganda and her neighbors, and 
the policy that provides over protection to some industries.  
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3. Analytical Framework  
 
 
The primary goal of Uganda’s tax reforms was to increase the level of government 
revenue (tax/GDP). Empirical evidence shows that tax policies that make the yield of 
individual taxes responsive to changes in national income (GDP), and ensure that the 
predominant taxes in the revenue are those with a highly elastic yield with respect to 
national income (or proxy bases) are revenue enhancing. We applied the concept of 
elasticity and tax buoyancy to measure the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in 
income (excluding the effects of discretionary changes)16 and the total response of tax 
revenue to changes in income. 
  
3.1 Elasticity index and tax buoyancy  
We computed elasticities and buoyancies for the pre-reform period as well as the post-
reform period. Elasticities (tax-to-base and base-to-income) were estimated for each tax 
and for the overall tax system. We applied the approach, similar to that in Mansfield 
(1972) - that is:  
Elasticity of total tax revenue to income:  
t
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Elasticity of kth individual tax to income:   
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where  
Tt  =  Total tax revenue  
Tk  =  Revenue from the kth tax 
Y   =  Income (GDP) 
Δ   =  Change operator 
In turn, the income elasticity of each individual tax can be decomposed into two 
components: elasticity of tax to base and the elasticity of the base to income. Thus:  
Elasticity of kth individual tax to base:   
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Elasticity of kth individual base to income:  
k
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where 
Bk = Base of the kth tax 
Therefore, in a system of n taxes: 
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Equation (5) states that the elasticity of total tax revenue to income is equal to the 
weighted sum of individual tax elasticities - as provided in Mansfield (1972).  As shown 
above, the elasticity of kth tax may be decomposed into the product of the elasticity 
relative to the base and the elasticity of the base to income: 
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It therefore, follows that the elasticity of total revenue to income in a system of n taxes is 
the product of the elasticity of tax to base and base to income for each individual tax 
weighted by the significance of that tax in the total tax system: 
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This analysis helps us to identify the source of fast revenue growth or lagging revenue 
growth in the tax system (Mansfield 1972: 427). It also permits identification of the 
component of revenue growth, which is within or outside the control of authorities. For 
instance, the tax-to-base constituent of elasticity is partly within the control of the 
authorities, but the base-to-income elasticity is determined, largely by changes in 
structure of the economy and economic growth – therefore not within the control of 
authorities.  
 
  
   
 28 
3.2  Estimation procedure 
 
a) Elasticity 
The relationship between tax revenue and income is approximated by the function: 
 YT *             
Rewritten as:  
tt LogYLogLogT  
*           (8) 
where tt  log  
T = tax revenue,   = tax elasticity (measure of the percentage change in tax revenue 
arising from 1% change in income Y (GDP). 
 
To obtain *tT , this study adopted the Proportional Adjustment (PA) technique developed 
by Prest (1962) – to eliminate the discretionary effects from the revenue series. The PRA 
method was chosen because of its superiority to other techniques e.g. the Constant Rate 
Structure (CRS).  The PRA method has been used in a number of studies, including 
Mansfield (1972) in Paraguay, Osoro (1993) in Tanzania, Chipeta (1998) in Malawi, and 
Muriithi and Moyi (2003) in Kenya. 
      
A preliminary series of adjusted tax yields was prepared by subtracting from the actual 
yield for each year the estimated amount attributed to the discretionary change in that 
year. That is, 
  
If ,,,, 21 tTTT    are actual tax yields for a series of years, and  
tDDD ,,, 21    are estimates of the discretionary changes for various years, then  
ttt TDTTDTTDT 112221111 ,,,   represent preliminary adjusted tax series i.e. the 
actual tax collected each year adjusted to the structure of that year (with t=1 as the 
base/reference year). T11, T12,…, T1t represents what the tax receipts would have been if 
the tax structure had remained as in year 1 with all discretionary changes removed from 
the years following year 1.  
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To adjust the revenue yield in the preliminary tax series so as to reflect revenue yields 
based on the structure of the reference year for each year (this study adopted 1988/89 as 
the reference/base year), the preliminary adjusted tax (e.g. T1,t) is multiplied by the 
previous year’s ratio of the adjusted tax with reference to the base year (T*)t-1 expressed 
as a ratio of the actual tax revenue (Tt-1).  That is, 
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b) Buoyancy 
 Buoyancy of taxes with respect to income (GDP) is estimated using the following 
equation:  
tt LogYLogLogT           (9) 
where 
T = Tax revenue 
Y = Income  
 = Stochastic disturbance term, and 
  = Tax buoyancy. 
3.3  Impact of macroeconomic variables on tax revenue 
The analysis of tax yield using the approach described above does not allow for the 
accurate formulation of the relationship between tax receipts and income by adding other 
independent variables to the estimating equation (Manisfield, 1972 p428). Variables such 
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as exchange rates, inflation, budget deficits, import volumes, and revenue administration 
can affect tax revenue. 
   
In developing countries, where collection lags are experienced, inflation is likely to have 
a negative impact on real tax revenue. High levels of inflation may increase tax-payers 
propensity to delay tax payment. Existence of collection lags for tax payments implies a 
real revenue loss during inflation, which is a direct function of the ratio of inflation, the 
size of the collection lags, and the initial level of taxation (Tanzi, 1988). Moreover, high 
inflation rates can also reduce the tax base as economic agents try to make portfolio 
adjustments in favor of assets that typically escape the domestic tax net (Ghura, 1998). 
  
Fiscal policy defines the agenda for revenue target. The level of budgeted government 
spending, inflows of foreign aid, debt financing and fiscal deficits determine the amount 
of taxes that the revenue collection agency is expected to collect. Meanwhile, increased 
level of foreign aid can have a significant impact on revenue by artificially (and 
temporarily) increasing the tax base as the level of economic activity tends to respond to 
the inflows (Seade, 1990). A substitution effect between domestic tax revenue 
mobilization and availability of external grants is also possible. In which case, increases 
in external financing will lead to a fall in domestic tax revenue (Ghura, 1998). 
 
Countries that allow the exchange rate to appreciate are likely to experience a loss in their 
revenue (Tanzi, 1988; Seade, 1990). A depreciation of the real exchange rate raises 
import costs and reduces import volume (if import demand is price elastic) and thus 
imports tax receipts. Lastly, literacy improves tax compliance through better 
understanding of the tax laws/obligations and ability to file tax returns. 
 
To capture the impact of some of the variables discussed above, particularly exchange 
rate, inflation rate, foreign inflow, and fiscal deficit on tax revenue the following 
equations were estimated. 
   
),,,( LINRLFAIDLFDEFLRERfID        (10) 
),,,,( LFDEFLRERLITLFAIDLINRfIT        (11) 
 
  
   
 31 
),,,,( LITLINRLFAIDLFDEFLRERfTR        (12) 
where  
ID is the ratio of import duties to GDP; IT is the ratio of income tax to GDP; and TR is 
the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP. LRER is the real exchange rate; LFDEF is the ratio 
of budget deficit to GDP; LFAID is the ratio of external grant to GDP, INR is underlying 
inflation; LIT is a dummy for literacy; and L is the log operator.  
3.4  Proxy tax bases and data sources 
The major tax categories that are considered here are: direct taxes, import duties, excise 
duties and sales/VAT. For direct taxes, the factors that produce the incomes are assumed 
to pay the associated taxes. Thus, the proxy base for income taxes are domestic factor 
incomes derived from the data on the sources of income side of the national accounts 
compiled by Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). UBOS publishes annually the 
Statistical Abstract which contains, among others, time-series data on government 
revenues, consumer prices and national accounts. 
 
We used import values (c.i.f) from the balance of payments as the proxy base for import 
duties; and private final consumption as the proxy base for excise duties, and sales 
tax/VAT – since sales tax/VAT has been levied at retail and wholesale levels. The proxy 
base for the overall tax system was GDP. The data on private consumption and GDP 
were obtained from the Statistical Abstract (for various years) published by the UBOS, 
and the data on imports (c.i.f), exchange rate, inflation rate and domestic factor incomes 
were obtained from Bank of Uganda Annual and Quarterly Reports.  
 
Revenue data (for individual tax handles) were derived from the quarterly and annual 
statistical reports prepared by Uganda Revenue Authority. These are also available in 
Statistical Abstracts and Background to the Budget. Estimates of the discretionary tax 
changes were obtained from the Budget Speeches and from the Tax Policy Department of 
the Ministry of Finance. Information on tax reforms, fiscal operations, and foreign aid 
were obtained from the Ministry of Finance, the World Bank and the IMF publications. 
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4. Reforms and Responses of the Tax Revenues to Income 
 
 
The results presented in this section reflect a decomposition of the income elasticity of 
main tax revenue in Uganda with respect to income into two components: elasticity of 
revenue to base and elasticity of base to income. For the Uganda tax system to continue 
to raise adequate revenue, it helps if individual taxes are income-elastic. This occurs 
when revenue rises in line with national income (GDP) even when no adjustments are 
made to the tax rates or bases i.e. revenue that would be generated automatically if the tax 
system were to remain unchanged over time.17  
4.1  Elasticity estimates for the pre and post-reform period, combined 
The elasticity for Uganda’s overall tax system for the period 1988/89-2003/04 was 0.636 
(Table 6). This means that the tax structure in Uganda is inelastic. This result is very 
similar to the elasticity reported by Muriithi and Moyi (2003) for the tax system in 
Kenya. For every 1% rise in GDP during 1988/89-2003/04, the Uganda tax system 
yielded only a 0.636% increase in tax revenue, resulting from economic activity alone. 
This yield is particularly affected by low tax-to-base elasticity of direct taxes and import 
duties and low base-to-income elasticity of excise duties and VAT/sales tax. 
 
Table 6. Uganda: Elasticity of main taxes, 1988/89-2003/04 
    Buoyancy 
coefficient 
      Elasticity indexes  Buoyancy 
less tax-to-
income elast.  Tax to income Tax to base Base to income 
Direct taxes  1.495 0.938 0.623 1.519 0.557 
Import duties  1.321 1.048 0.896 1.157 0.273 
Excise duties 1.429 0.919 1.006 0.940 0.510 
VAT/sales tax  1.310 1.009 1.076 0.940 0.301 
Overall tax system 1.311 0.636 -- -- 0.675 
 
Notes: Buoyancy/elasticity estimation allows for lags, and coefficients (elasticity and buoyancy) are calculated in real terms 
 
The low tax-to-base elasticity of direct taxes (0.623) with high proxy base-to-income 
coefficient (1.519) signifies a big proportion of untaxed or uncollected revenue. This can 
be due to informal sector activities that are not captured by the tax system, exemptions 
(see discussion on tax reform, under income tax), and non-remittance of taxes by 
businesses, including illegal business operations and ‘briefcase’ activities that by-pass the 
tax net. 
 
  
   
 33 
 
The low tax-to-base elasticity of import duties is attributed, in part, to effect of tax 
evasion and inefficiency in revenue administration, and growth in imports of goods and 
services that are exempt or zero-rated e.g. foodstuffs, drugs and medicines, etc. However, 
import duties still yielded the highest tax-to-income elasticity coefficient (1.048), while 
excise duties had the lowest. The base for import duties (same for direct taxes) has grown 
in line with growth in GDP although the growth in revenue lagged behind the growth in 
the tax base. This implies that the taxes responded poorly to changes in income between 
1989 and 2004.  
 
The poor response of excise revenue to changes in income is due to low base to income 
elasticity. The elastic response of the excise revenue to changes in the tax base means that 
potential for increasing excise revenue exists. This will be realized with future expansion 
of the tax base and ability of private final consumption to grow in line with the growth in 
GDP. The base-to-income elasticity of VAT/sales tax seems to be affected, largely by 
high poverty and rate of unemployment. Increasing revenue from VAT/sales in the short 
term could be achieved by improving efficiency within the tax administration as well as 
abolishing some of the exemptions and applying zero-rate to exclusively exports.  
 
The relatively low tax-to-base elasticity of the individual tax categories (with an average 
coefficient of 0.9), compared with their base-to-income coefficients (of 1.139 on average) 
implies that the inelasticity of the overall tax system is caused mainly by problem of poor 
collection of taxes than by the effect of inelastic nature of the tax bases. More efforts 
should therefore be directed to increasing the responsiveness of the individual taxes to the 
base especially import duties and direct taxes.   
 
However, the high buoyancy coefficients18 (Table 6, last column: the difference between 
buoyancy and tax-to-income elasticity indexes) indicate significant revenue impact of 
discretionary measures that were introduced between 1988/89 and 2003/04. The largest 
impact of these measures is evident in direct taxes. The discretionary tax policy yielded a 
0.6 percent rise in direct taxes and 0.3 percent rise in import duty revenue for every one 
percent growth in GDP. 
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4.2  Elasticity estimates for the pre-reform period 
The coefficients presented in Table 7 reflect the income elasticity of the tax revenue 
during the period between 1988/89-1995/96. Prior to 1996/97, no major reforms of the 
tax system had taken place apart from establishment of the URA. The table shows an 
inelastic response of the overall tax revenue to changes in income as reflected in tax-to-
income elasticity coefficient of 0.648. This was due to low tax-to-base elasticity of direct 
taxes and excise duty; and sluggish growth in proxy-base for VAT/sales tax and excise 
(private final consumption) in relation to income (GDP). The tax-to-income elasticity 
coefficients of import duties (1.256) and VAT/sales tax (1.037) signify elastic yields of 
these taxes prior to the major reforms.  
 
Table 7. Uganda: Elasticity of main taxes, 1988/89-1995/96 
    Buoyancy 
coefficient 
      Elasticity indexes  
Buoyancy 
less tax- to-
income elast.  Tax to income Tax to base Base to income 
Direct taxes  1.337 0.706 0.479 1.479 0.631 
Import duties  1.569 1.256 1.066 1.166 0.313 
Excise duties 1.333 0.705 0.830 0.965 0.628 
VAT/sales tax   1.192 1.037 1.073 0.965 0.155 
Overall tax system 1.299 0.648 --- --- 0.651 
 
Notes: Buoyancy/elasticity estimation allows for lags, and coefficients (elasticity and buoyancy) are calculated in real terms 
 
The low tax-to-income elasticity of direct taxes (0.706) is the outcome of low tax-to-base 
elasticity (0.479), which reflects poor revenue yield from direct taxes especially income 
tax before major reforms were implemented. This was mainly caused by the large 
informal sector activities that were not captured by the tax system, exemptions, and 
illegal business operations that by-passed the tax-net. The favorable response of import 
duties to changes in GDP was partly because of the introduction of 10% import duty on 
agricultural inputs (except fertilizers, pesticides and seed) and all raw materials in the 
early 1990s; and 10% import duty on all previously zero-rated items.  
 
The relatively high revenue yield from sales tax was due to improvement in tax collection 
and introduction of sales tax on all zero-rated and exempt products (in 1989/90). The 
buoyancy index for the overall tax system during the pre-reform period (1988/89-
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2003/04) was 1.299 compared to the post reform index of 1.202. This means that revenue 
increases during pre-reform period were driven by discretionary tax measures. 
4.3  Elasticity estimates for post-reform period 
The post reform period refers to the period between 1996/97-2003/04, when major tax 
reforms were implemented in Uganda. Table 8 shows elasticity of less than one (i.e. 
0.545) for the overall tax system, and elasticity of more than one for direct taxes (i.e. 
2.082) and VAT (1.306). Increase in yield of VAT/sales tax resulted from some 
improvement in revenue collection associated with the introduction of the VAT in 1996. 
However, responses of the overall tax revenues to changes in national income are 
affected by inefficiency in revenue administration, exemptions, tax evasion and sluggish 
response of the individual tax bases (except base for direct taxes) to changes in income.    
 
Table 8. Uganda: Elasticity of main taxes, 1996/97-2003/04 
    Buoyancy 
coefficient 
      Elasticity indexes  Buoyancy 
less tax- to-
income elast.  Tax to income Tax to base Base to income 
Direct taxes  2.145 2.082 1.031 2.021 0.063 
Import duties  0.637 0.382 0.244 0.638 0.255 
Excise duties 0.664 0.304 0.325 0.857 0.360 
VAT/sales tax   1.386 1.306 1.452 0.857 0.080 
Overall tax system 1.202 0.545 --- --- 0.657 
 
Notes: Buoyancy/elasticity estimation allows for lags, and coefficients (elasticity and buoyancy) are calculated in real terms 
 
Direct taxes performed well because of the favorable response of the tax base to changes 
in income. This favorable response came about as a result of the new Income Act that 
was enacted in 1997 and subsequent reduction in discretionary tax exemptions, which 
helped to widen the tax base. Other contributory factors are increase in wage rates in the 
civil service following the recent pay-reform, and the abolition of tax holidays as well as 
clarification of taxation of benefits in kind as part of the income tax (law) reforms – 
which helped to improve the tax base and increase revenues from corporate and personal 
income taxes. 
  
VAT also performed well mainly because of the responsiveness of VAT revenue to 
changes in the tax base (private consumption). However this improvement was small 
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because of the problem of tax evasion and growth in consumption of goods and services 
that are exempt or zero-rated e.g. foodstuffs, agricultural outputs and inputs, drugs and 
medicines and medical services, educational services, hotel accommodation, etc. So, 
whether VAT revenue rose more quickly to changes in the tax base, only a small change 
occurred after the reform because of the same problem. The low base-to-income elasticity 
of VAT (0.876) reflects low responsiveness of private final consumption to growth in 
national income (GDP).  
 
The elastic revenue yield for direct taxes and VAT means that the tax policies that 
Uganda government implemented between 1996/97 and 2003/04 increased the 
responsiveness of these taxes to changes in national income. However, the VAT base has 
lagged behind growth in income as evident by low base-to-income elasticity of only 
0.857 compared to tax-to-base elasticity of 1.452. This means that reform implemented 
by government could have led to higher revenue yield if the VAT base (private final 
consumption) grew in line with the income. Policy that would lead to increase in private 
consumption has great potential for increasing VAT revenue in Uganda. Similarly, for 
direct taxes, the growth in tax collection lags behind the growth of the base in relation to 
income – shown by the huge gap between tax-to-base and base-to-income elasticity 
indexes – suggesting that there are taxable revenues in the public lying untaxed. This 
shows that potential for increasing government revenue through direct taxation exists. 
 
The low response of excise revenue to changes in private final consumption and import 
duties to changes in imports (c.i.f value) portrays loss of revenue from excise and import 
duties. The demand for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes frequently rises less quickly 
than income (GDP), and so excise revenue is likely to be less elastic. However, the  low 
yield of imports revenue (which is directly related to the sluggish response of the imports 
revenue to changes in the tax base) is caused by an increase in the share of exempt and 
zero-rated imports (c.i.f value) to total imports (c.i.f value); remissions, and poor 
collection of imports revenue (duties) due to tax evasion; decline in growth of the real 
value of imports especially fuel imports (tax rate on fuel remained specific, constant, and 
unadjusted for inflation for over four years – after 1996/97) and decline in duty revenue 
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from raw materials imports (10% import duty on selected raw materials were waived off 
in 2001/02).  
4.4  Comparison between pre and post-reform period 
 
Table 7 and 8 indicate positive changes in the elasticity coefficients involving two main 
taxes: direct taxes and VAT/sales tax. Reforms brought a significant improvement in the 
yield of direct taxes, that is, from inelastic yield before major reforms to elastic yield 
after the reforms. This was achieved through improvement in the tax base, which grew in 
line with GDP. However, the capacity of the VAT to raise more revenue is constrained 
by the ability of the proxy-base for VAT (private final consumption) to expand in relation 
to changes in income (worsen after the reform). No marked difference is noted in the 
response of excise revenue to changes in income, prior to or after the major reforms of 
the tax system.   
   
Import revenue had inelastic yields with respect to national income and proxy bases, 
during the post reform period. The yields were elastic during pre reform period. The 
unusual decline in yield of import duties is explained by the same reason mentioned in 
the previous section, including poor collection of imports revenue due to increase in tax 
evasion and share of exempt and zero-rated imports to total imports (c.i.f value), and 
remissions; and decline in growth of the real value of imports especially fuel imports (tax 
rate on fuel remained specific, constant, and unadjusted for inflation for over four years 
1996/97) and the removal of 10% import duty on selected imported raw materials.    
 
5. Tax Responses to Changing Economic Trends 
 
 
The results for the regression analysis (with income tax/GDP, import duty/GDP and the 
overall tax/GDP as dependent variables and set of explanatory variables described in 
section 3) are presented in Tables 9. The reported R-squared suggests that estimated 
models provide reasonably good fits to the data. Further analyses were undertaken to 
understand the interdependency between income tax and import revenue and to establish 
how exchange rate depreciation has affected prices and volumes of import. 
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Table 9. Uganda: OLS results for income tax, import duty and overall tax revenues 
  Income Tax/GDP Equation Import Duty/GDP Equation Overall Tax/GDP Equation 
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Literacy rate 
 
4.029*** 5.827    0.924** 1.981 
0.691      0.467   
Inflation (Underlying) 
 
-0.0067* -0.098 -0.076*  -1.350 -0.113** -2.461 
0.098   0.056   0.046   
External grant to GDP (%) 
 
-0.0041* 0.217 0.0041*  0.012 -0.057* -0.392 
0.098   0.335  0.146   
Real exchange rate  
(Ush to US$) 
0.131* 
0.625 
0.210 
1.331* 
0.898 
1.481 
 
0.447* 
0.422 1.06 
Budget deficit to GDP (%) 
 
0.092* 1.352 -0.272** -2.584 -0.092* -2.007 
0.69   0.105   0.046   
Constant 
 
-16.716***   -4.637* -1.288 -3.146*   
2.986 -5.598 3.600   2.014 -1.562 
R-Squared 0.960   0.899   0.942   
DW 2.261   1.353   2.141   
Std. deviation 0.503   0.342   0.277   
Number of observations 16   16   16   
   
Notes:     Standard errors reported in italics. All continuous variables are logged 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at the 10% level using one-tailed test. 
 
The effect of inflation and exchange rate on income tax becomes stronger with inclusion 
of import duty in the income tax/GDP equation. The coefficient depicts an inverse 
relation suggesting that increase in import revenue reduces effort to raise income tax. On 
the other hand, effect of inflation on the import tax revenue is strengthened when income 
tax is included in the import duty/GDP equation. Again, an inverse relation between the 
two types of revenue is obtained, which portrays a substitution effect. Effort to collect 
import revenue is reduced by the increasing level of income tax. This is particularly true 
where the resources for revenue generation available to the tax collection agency such as 
personnel and facilitation are inadequate. 
 
5.1  Impact of external aid and fiscal deficit 
 
The coefficient on external grant is negative and significant for income tax, and the 
overall tax equations (Table 9). This suggests that increase in external grants 
(development aid) reduces effort to collect revenue. However, the effect tends to be 
small. For example, a 1% rise in the ratio of external grant/GDP reduces income tax 
revenue by a 0.045% point of GDP and the overall tax by 0.05% point of GDP.  
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In recent years there has been a growing interest in the possible linkages between high 
levels of development aid and taxation in Africa (Therkildsen, 2001). It is assumed that, 
without aid, government would be forced to raise more taxes or cut its spending if it 
cannot raise more taxes, or borrow from other sources. According to the present findings, 
increase in development aid appears to be a source of disincentive to making full use of 
domestic resources for revenue generation. This could be the reason why revenue targets 
have become a major component of aid conditionality in Uganda.  
 
Fortunately, there is an indication of increased effort to raise more revenue through 
increased import duties in response to increasing level of development aid. This is 
reflected in a positive coefficient of 0.004 (on external grant). Growth in import revenue 
lags behind increase in grant. Results in Table 9 also reveal that lower budget deficit 
reduces effort to collect revenue, particularly income tax. The result is consistent with the 
findings on effect of increased grant as lower budget deficit has often been a result of 
increased grant/aid.  
 
With inverse relationship between import revenue and budget deficit (negative coefficient 
of 0.272), the result does not appear to support the assumption that increasing fiscal 
deficit encourages effort to collect more revenue through increased import duties. 
Farhadian and Katz (1989) included fiscal deficit as one of the explanatory variables in 
the import duty/GDP equation and found it insignificant. It is assumed that countries 
faced with an increased trade deficit may try to restrict imports as an alternative to 
exchange rate adjustment. This will reduce import duties. Some analysts have argued that 
countries faced with large/growing fiscal deficits and public debt, are likely to rely on 
inflationary finance rather than on non-inflationary revenue (Ortiz 1988; Tanzi, 1988).  
5.2  Impact of foreign exchange rate  
 
Coefficients on exchange rate are positive and significant for import (1.331) and overall 
tax/GDP (0.447) equation. Import revenue is therefore highly sensitive to changes in 
exchange rate. Depreciation of Uganda shilling by one percent against the US dollar can 
increase import revenue by a 1 percent point of GDP, income tax by 0.13% and overall 
tax revenue by 0.4% point of GDP. Exchange rate depreciation causes an upward shift in 
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the relative prices of goods and services leading to increased import receipt and revenue 
in local currency. In other words the real value of imports, measured in domestic prices 
increases as exchange rate depreciates. However, higher duty rates can lead to a lower 
import volume (hence offsetting the positive revenue impact of depreciation) if price 
elasticity of imports is greater than one. Our estimation of aggregate price elasticity of 
imports is 0.176. 
 
The OLS results (using import volume as dependent variable – not in Table 9) reveal a 
positive relationship between exchange rate depreciation and volumes of imports. A 
coefficient of 3.393 (1% level of significance, R2 = 0.889) was obtained. Importers seem, 
therefore, to respond to exchange rate depreciation by purchasing more foreign exchange 
(because of uncertainty about the stability of the shilling). Volume of imports goes up. 
Importers try to maximize the gain from the increased value of imports (measured in 
domestic prices) arising from exchange rate depreciation. Moreover, with many big 
businesses in Uganda run by foreign nationals, and Ugandans who hold foreign currency 
account, depreciation of the shilling may not necessarily be detrimental to imports.  
 
Depreciation has a positive impact on import prices (shown by coefficient of 0.209). 
These findings suggest that the changes in exchange rate over the past years have not had 
negative impact on imports. With regards to income tax, depreciation is likely to depress 
real wages, including other non-tradable in the economy leading to decline in PAYE. On 
the other hand, international mobility of capital and improved business profitability can 
lead to a rise in corporate income tax. The net balance between these two opposing forces 
eventually determines the impact of exchange rate on income tax.  
5.3  Impact of inflation  
 
The coefficients on inflation are negative and significant at 10% level for income and 
import tax revenues, and 5% for overall tax revenue. Rising inflation seems to affect 
collection of import tax than income tax (Table 9) – reflected in coefficients of 0.076 and 
0.0067, respectively. That is, a 1 percent rise in underlying inflation per annum reduced 
income tax revenue by a 0.006 percentage point of GDP compared with 0.076% for the 
case of import revenue. The weak relationship between income tax and changes in 
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inflation shows that inflation has not significantly affected collection of income tax in the 
recent past due to the prudent monetary policies, which kept inflation below 5% most of 
the time. This supports our earlier findings. Allowing for lags in the analysis of revenue 
elasticity based on real terms led to a significant fall in the yield of import revenue (from 
tax-to-income elasticity of 0.394 to 0.244) compared to the slight decrease in the yield 
direct taxes (from 2.106 to 2.082) in the same period. The greater influence on import tax 
may suggest some degree of reliance on inflationary tax.   
5.4  Impact of literacy rate  
 
There appear to be a strong relationship between income tax revenue and literacy rate as 
shown by an index of 4.16 (Table 9). This suggests that government can achieve a 
significant rise in income tax revenue by investing in mass education (as it is doing now 
with UPE, but tax education needs to be emphasized as well).   
 
6. Conclusions  
 
 
Uganda Government initiated sequence of tax reforms since the late 1980s to address the 
fiscal challenges facing the country. This study focused on the link between tax reforms 
and revenue mobilization. For the tax system to be revenue enhancing, the yield of 
individual taxes should be responsive to changes in national income (GDP), and the 
predominant taxes in the revenue should be those with a highly elastic yield with respect 
to national income (or proxy bases).  
 
The empirical results and analysis presented in the previous sections suggest that the tax 
reforms had different impacts on different taxes, and that a half of the predominant taxes 
in the revenue had elastic yield with respect to national income (or proxy base). That is, 
reforms had a positive impact on direct taxes and VAT/sales tax as evidenced by increase 
in tax-to-income elasticity index of about 1.4 (i.e. from 0.706 to 2.082: the pre - and post-
reform periods) for direct taxes, and 0.321 (i.e. from 1.037 to 1.306) for VAT/sales tax. 
Revenue yield of import duties deteriorated so much after the reforms as shown by a 
decline in tax-to-income elasticity index of about 0.9 i.e., from 1.256 to 0.382 (pre and 
post-reform period, respectively).   
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The reforms had a bigger impact on direct taxes than on indirect taxes, suggesting that tax 
evasion is still a major problem for indirect taxes especially import duties. Other factors 
that are responsible for decline in yield of import revenue is increase in the share of 
exempt and zero-rated imports to total imports (c.i.f value); remissions; and decline in 
growth of the real value of imports especially fuel imports as tax rate on fuel remained 
unadjusted for inflation for over four years; and the removal of 10% import duty on 
selected imported raw materials.  Improved performance of direct taxes can be explained 
by the contribution of the new Income Tax Act 1997, which improved the administration 
of income taxes, reduced discretionary exemptions and made the tax procedure simpler 
for taxpayers and revenue administrators, and by increase in the wage rates in civil 
service, among other factors.  
  
While yield has improved for two major taxes, the yield of the overall tax system is 
inelastic with respect to national income, and actually declined during the post-reform 
period. This scenario, coupled with inelastic responses of import and excise duties and 
the low base-to-income elasticity of VAT/sales tax suggests that the tax reforms hardly 
increased the revenue mobilisation capacity of the Uganda tax system. Nevertheless, 
direct taxes and VAT are key potential growth areas for revenue mobilization, and 
therefore key areas to rely on for raising future revenues.  
 
As the findings show, there is room for further improvement in collection of direct taxes 
by strengthening the capacity of URA to register more eligible taxpayers into the tax net. 
The huge gap between tax-to-base and base-to-income elasticity indexes is a sign of 
potential revenues in the public lying untaxed. Increased investment growth in the 
country and deepened economic base that accompanies economic growth, will help future 
growth of direct taxes.  Reforms had nearly neutral impact on excise duties. This is not 
surprising because the demand for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes frequently rises less 
quickly than income (GDP), and so excise revenue is likely to be less elastic even after 
reforms. Nevertheless, excise duties have much greater potential to contribute to revenue 
as evidence by the higher base-to-income elasticity compared with the tax-to-income 
elasticity index. Government needs to identify new items to bring into the tax net e.g. 
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plastic shoes or raise rates on items that carry low excise relative to the rates in the SSA 
region.   
 
Among other trends revealed by this study is that during the course of the 1990s, up to 
present, Uganda’s tax structure has been greatly improved and there is not much that 
remains to be done, except to administer it equitably and efficiently. The structure of the 
tax system broadly mirrors the tax system in other countries (SSA), in terms of the types 
of taxes and rates. While differences in excises rates and bases, and exemptions under 
VAT, import duty and income tax etc. seemingly explain, in part, the difference in 
tax/GDP relative to other countries, greater explanations are likely to lie with differences 
in the levels of development, the structure of the economies, degree of commercialization 
and urbanization, size of the peasant population, poverty, and level of corruption among 
other factors (as highlighted in the examples in Table 4). 
 
Finally, the results of the regression analysis on the response of tax revenue (with 
reference to income tax and import duty) to changing economic trend imply that external 
aid, fiscal deficit and inflation, changes in exchange rate (depreciation) have significant 
influence on tax revenue. Clearly, improving the revenue performance will require a 
major improvement in tax administration, increase in the level of employment, and 
reduction in tax exemptions and corruption. Further adjustments in tax rates (except tax 
thresholds and some excisable goods) are not necessary at the moment (or in the medium 
term). Effort should be directed to improving tax collection and reducing corruption, 
improving welfare through employment generation and other poverty reduction 
strategies. Measures that could be undertaken to reduce corruption include winning 
public confidence through improved service delivery and government payment (for goods 
and services); making the tax procedures simple and transparent and improving on 
taxpayers’ education; effective use of automated systems especially in the clearing 
system and monitoring refund claims; and strengthening tax administration including 
staff investigative machinery and human resource management capability. 
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Appendixes 
 
Table A2.1: Uganda: Domestic Revenue in Billions Uganda Shilling, 1988/89-2003/04 
Sources of revenue 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Total URA 
Revenue  44.60 89.57 133.79 180.46 282.60 373.35 506.99 611.70 735.92 812.29 958.28 1008.00 1110.15 1251.25 1438.42 1,694.81 
Income Tax 4.77 9.46 13.87 23.64 43.57 50.77 64.50 67.68 88.25 107.88 148.43 158.79 200.12 259.48 319.94 402.22 
 -PAYE 0.50 0.71 1.01 3.21 11.19 14.61 20.33 25.04 38.33 48.41 67.65 83.47 103.55 137.31 168.27 200.27 
 -Corporate Tax 4.28 8.76 12.86 20.43 31.25 24.79 24.49 24.08 25.65 29.25 44.31 40.89 54.27 69.41 84.22 121.58 
 -Others  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.13 11.38 19.68 18.56 24.27 30.23 36.47 34.43 42.30 52.77 67.45 80.36 
Excise duty 
(domestic) 4.91 7.25 12.42 15.03 18.78 40.37 48.63 61.36 86.26 98.18 104.64 107.77 101.27 116.25 113.24 128.55 
International 
Trade 19.29 49.55 80.58 100.58 165.98 211.22 297.59 356.69 453.44 466.18 543.55 555.45 611.07 633.26 721.75 861.31 
 -Petroleum duty 3.11 15.90 36.14 54.50 82.52 92.83 119.66 150.76 197.46 188.27 193.21 197.20 199.30 222.17 240.68 269.81 
 -Import duty 4.68 9.18 13.44 21.54 38.68 52.56 65.14 75.86 72.27 78.05 96.48 105.09 141.01 117.22 133.07 133.95 
 -Excise duty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.40 1.98 5.73 17.75 17.60 25.01 23.60 24.30 23.01 34.83 48.84 
 -VAT (Imports) 5.30 9.78 16.45 20.41 36.76 46.96 67.11 77.70 129.26 144.61 181.24 178.87 199.45 218.37 251.06 332.59 
 -Other duties 6.21 14.69 14.55 4.13 8.02 17.47 43.70 46.64 36.70 37.64 47.61 50.69 47.01 52.48 62.11 76.13 
VAT (Domestic)  13.18 20.51 23.16 28.25 47.08 61.92 83.86 110.25 87.83 116.32 140.02 164.26 174.75 213.43 244.41 240.93 
Total Import  7.79 25.08 49.58 76.04 121.20 145.39 184.80 226.62 269.73 266.33 289.69 302.29 340.31 339.39 373.74 403.76 
Total VAT (Dom. + 
Imports) 18.48 30.29 39.61 48.66 83.84 108.88 150.97 187.95 217.09 260.93 321.26 343.13 374.20 431.80 495.47 573.52 
Fees & Licenses 1.41 2.80 3.76 3.65 6.45 8.70 12.41 15.73 20.14 23.73 21.65 21.73 22.94 28.84 39.08 61.80 
GDP at factor costs 
current prices 895 1,376 1,830 2,589 3,625.94 4,069 4,922 5,565 6,048 6,868 7,381 8,984 10,033 10,305 11,884 13,242 
 
Source: Uganda Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
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Table A2.1 cont... Uganda: Tax Revenues as Percentage of GDP 
 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Total tax revenue  5.0 6.5 7.3 7.0 7.8 9.2 10.3 10.1 12.2 11.8 13.0 11.2 11.1 12.2 12.1 12.6 
Income Tax 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.0 
 -PAYE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 
 -Corporate Tax 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 
 -Others  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Excise duty (domestic) 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 
International Trade 2.2 3.6 4.4 3.9 4.6 5.2 6.0 5.9 7.5 6.8 7.4 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.5 
 -Petroleum duty 0.3 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 
 -Import duty 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 
 -Excise duty 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
 -VAT on Imports 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.3 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.5 
 -Other duties 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
VAT (domestic)  1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.8 
Fees and Licenses 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Total VAT (dom. + imports) 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.6 3.8 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.2 4.3 
Total Excise (dom. + imports) 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 
 
 
Table A2.1 cont… Uganda: Tax Revenues as Percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
Sources of revenue 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Income Tax 10.70 10.56 10.37 13.10 15.42 13.60 12.72 11.06 11.99 13.28 15.49 15.75 18.03 20.74 22.24 23.73 
 -PAYE 1.11 0.79 0.75 1.78 3.96 3.91 4.01 4.09 5.21 5.96 7.06 8.28 9.33 10.97 11.70 11.82 
 -Corporate Tax 9.59 9.77 9.61 11.32 11.06 6.64 4.83 3.94 3.49 3.60 4.62 4.06 4.89 5.55 5.86 7.17 
 -Others  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 3.05 3.88 3.03 3.30 3.72 3.81 3.42 3.81 4.22 4.69 4.74 
Excise duty (domestic) 11.01 8.09 9.28 8.33 6.65 10.81 9.59 10.03 11.72 12.09 10.92 10.69 9.12 9.29 7.87 7.58 
International Trade 43.26 55.32 60.23 55.74 58.73 56.57 58.70 58.31 61.62 57.39 56.72 55.10 55.04 50.61 50.18 50.82 
 -Petroleum duty 6.97 17.75 27.01 30.20 29.20 24.86 23.60 24.65 26.83 23.18 20.16 19.56 17.95 17.76 16.73 15.92 
 -Import duty 10.48 10.25 10.05 11.94 13.69 14.08 12.85 12.40 9.82 9.61 10.07 10.43 12.70 9.37 9.25 7.90 
 -Excise duty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.39 0.94 2.41 2.17 2.61 2.34 2.19 1.84 2.42 2.88 
 -VAT on Imports 11.88 10.92 12.30 11.31 13.01 12.58 13.24 12.70 17.56 17.80 18.91 17.74 17.97 17.45 17.45 19.62 
 -Other duties 13.91 16.40 10.88 2.29 2.84 4.68 8.62 7.62 4.99 4.63 4.97 5.03 4.23 4.19 4.32 4.49 
VAT (domestic goods/services) 29.54 22.90 17.31 15.65 16.66 16.58 16.54 18.02 11.93 14.32 14.61 16.30 15.74 17.06 16.99 14.22 
Total VAT (domestic & imports) 41.43 33.82 29.60 26.96 29.67 29.16 29.78 30.73 29.50 32.12 33.52 34.04 33.71 34.51 34.45 33.84 
 
Source: Uganda Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.  
Note:  International trade taxes include petroleum duty, import duty, excise on imports, VAT on imports, withholding taxes, temporary road licenses, commission on imports, re-export levy and hides and skins levy. 
Excise tax includes excise on domestic products and excise on imports. It excludes petroleum duty which is treated here as part of the import duty (put separately because of its significance to revenue). 
 
 
  
   
 49 
 
Table A2.2: Tax Revenues as Percentage of GDP in Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa  
   Ethiopia     
  1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/03 2003/04   
Tax Revenue 9.5 9.7 10.1 11.5 12.5 11.8 na   
Income tax 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.4 2.7 na   
VAT/sales tax 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.5 4.3 4.5 na   
Import duty 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.8 na   
Excise duty 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 na   
      Kenya           
  1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/03 2003/04   
Tax Revenue 26.9 23.5 21.1 20.8 19.1 19.1 21.2   
Income tax 8.9 7.5 7.0 6.3 6.1 6.8 6.9   
VAT/sales tax 5.6 5.3 5.3 6.0 5.5 5.7 6.0   
Import duty 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.4 2.3 1.9 2.1   
Excise duty 4.6 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1   
      Mauritius           
 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/03 2003/04  
Tax Revenue 19.4 na 19.1 17.0 16.0 18.2 19.6   
Income tax na na 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 na   
VAT/sales tax na na 5.2 5.0 5.3 6.7 na   
Import duty na na 3.9 2.9 2.5 2.3 na   
Excise duty na na 4.6 4.2 3.5 4.1 na   
      Malawi           
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003   
Tax Revenue 15.6 13.4 15.0 14.3 17.1 na 15.9   
Income tax 7.1 5.4 na 7.0 7.2 5.2 na   
VAT/Surtax 4.2 4.5 na 5.7 6.0 4.2 na   
Import duty 2.6 2.8 na 2.6 2.3 1.8 na   
Excise duty 0.7 0.8 na 0.7 1.1 1.9 na   
      Namibia           
  1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04   
Tax Revenue 30.5 31.6 33.6 33.7 29.4 29.6 28.8   
Income tax 9.8 11.0 10.8 12.3 11.8 14.1 11.0   
VAT/sales tax 9.9 9.6 10.0 9.2 7.5 6.8 8.3   
Import duty 10.2 10.3 11.5 13.6 9.5 8.2 8.9   
Excise duty na na na na na na na   
      Rwanda           
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004  
Tax Revenue 9.7 9.9 9.4 9.5 11.0 11.9 11.0   
Income tax 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.1   
VAT/sales tax 1.3 1.9 2 2 3.3 3.8 3.8   
Import duty 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.3   
Excise duty 1.9 2.2 2.8 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.8   
    Tanzania       
  1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04   
Tax Revenue 11.2 10.4 10.6 11.0 11.0 11.4 12.2   
Income tax 3.1 2.8 3.3 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.5   
VAT/sales tax 2.7 3.6 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.5 4.7   
Import duty 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1   
Excise duty 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8   
    Uganda       
  1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04   
Tax Revenue 11.8 13 11.2 11.1 12.2 12.1 12.6   
Income tax 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.0   
VAT 3.8 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.2 4.3   
Import duty 3.8 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0   
Excise duty 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4   
 
Sources: Ministry of Revenue (Government of Ethiopia), Ministry of Finance (Republic of Kenya); Bank of Mauritius; Reserve Bank of 
Malawi; Bank of Namibia; Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Republic of Rwanda and National Bank of Rwanda; Ministry of 
Finance, United Republic of Tanzania; and Uganda Revenue Authority / Ministry of Finance (GOU). 
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Table A2.3. Income Tax Structure (in Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) in 2003/04 
 
Kind of income tax and country 
Income tax bands in 
US$ 
Rate (%) 
Revenue as % of  
Total Tax GDP 
Kenya     
Overall Income tax   35 6.9 
Personal income tax     
          Over US$ To US$    
 0 1606 10   
 1606 3119 15   
 3119 4632 20   
 4632 6145 25   
 6145  30   
Corporate tax   30   
Withholding Taxes   Resident Non-Resident   
   i. Dividend   10 10   
   ii. Interest   15 15   
   iv. Management fees   20 20   
Malawi     
Overall income tax   21.6  
Personal income tax   16.0  
     Over US$ To US$    
 0 369 0   
 369 554 10   
 554 739 20   
 739 11577 30   
 11577  40   
Namibia     
Overall income tax   34.7 10.7 
Personal Income Tax   23.0 7.1 
Corporate tax   35 10.0 3.1 
(Personal income tax band) Over US$ To US$    
 0 2645 0   
 2645 5291 18   
 5291 10582 30   
 10582 26455 35   
 26455  36   
Rwanda     
Overall income tax   28 3.1 
Personal Income Tax (Revenue)   12 1.3 
Corporation Tax   40   
Personal income tax band Over US$ To US$    
 0 334 0   
 334 558 15   
 558 1115 25   
 1115 1860 30   
 1860  40   
Withholding Taxes   Resident Non-Resident   
   i. Dividend   20% 20%   
   ii. Interest   20% 20%   
   iv. Management fees2   15% 15%   
Tanzania     
Overall income tax revenue   29 3.5 
Person (individual) income tax 540  13 1.6 
Corporation Tax  30 7.8 0.9 
Withholding Taxes     3 0.4 
  Resident Non-Resident   
  i. Dividend   10 10   
  ii. Interest   10 10   
  iii. Management fees   20 20   
  iv. Commuted pension  10 15   
  v. Rent  5 15   
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Tanzania cont..      
Income band (individual) Over US$ To US$    
 0 570 0   
 570 2080 18.5   
 2080 4160 20   
 4160 6240 25   
 6240  30   
Uganda    /1     
Overall income tax revenue   23.7 3.0 
Personal (individual) income tax    11.8 1.5 
Corporation Tax   30 7.1 0.9 
Personal Income bands  Over US$ To US$    
(Exchange rate: 1 US$ = 1735 UShs) 0 906 0   
 906 1625 10   
 1625 2835 20   
 2835  30   
Withholding Taxes   Resident Non-Resident   
  i. Dividend   15 15   
  ii. Interest   15 15   
  iv. Management fees   15 15   
Zambia     
Overall income tax   36 7.0 
Personal income tax   26 5.0 
Corporate tax  30 7 1.3 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Kenya; Malawi Revenue Authority; the Namibian Tax Consortium, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, Republic of Rwanda and Rwanda Revenue Authority; Ministry of Finance (United Republic of Tanzania) and Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA); Uganda Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Republic of Uganda); 
and Ministry of Finance and National Planning (Republic of Zambia) 
 
Notes: 
1/ Uganda: 15% branch profit tax on repatriated income  
 30% declining balance depreciation for machinery, 45% for computers, 20% for office furniture, 5% straight line depreciation for 
most building. No tax holiday. 
 Kenya: 12.5% declining balance depreciation for most machinery and equipment, 30% for computers, 25% for vehicles, 2.5% 
straight line depreciation for most buildings (4% for hotels) 
 Tanzania: 50% first year for machinery, 12.5% declining balance for second and subsequent years for most machinery and 
equipment (37.5% for heavy vehicles), 5% straight line depreciation for buildings, full expensing for mining industry with 15% 
uplift each year for uncovered costs. 
 
2/ 15% temporary but adjustable to PAYE
 
  
   
 52 
Table A2.4 Excise Duty Structure and Rates in 2003/04 
 
 Uganda  Kenya  Tanzania  Rwanda Ethiopia 
 Revenue as % of GDP 1.4 4.1 1.8 1.8 1.2 
Petroleum products 
(per 1000 liters) Excise Rate 
Gasoline USh US$ KSh US$ TSh US$ Rate (%) Rate (%) 
  Premium 660,000 365 19,445 253 146,000 140 37 30 
  Regular 660,000 365 19,055 247 135,000 129 37 30 
Diesel 410,000 227 10,005 130 127,000 122 37 30 
Kerosene 200,000 111 5,755 75 122,000 117 37 30 
Tobacco products              
Cigarettes  Rate 130%     60 75 
    
Retail price per 
1,000 in KSh 
Rate in 
KSh  Per 1000 
Rate in 
TSh   
     up to 1,500 450 > 70mm 8,495   
      1,501 - 2,500 650 < 70mm 3,781   
      2,501 - 3,500 900 tobacco content   
   Above   3,500 1,400 < 70% 16,206   
          Safari   40%   30%       
          Sportsman & sweet Menthol       21%   
Alcoholic beverages  USh/liter Brand KSh/liter  TSh/liter   
Beer   60 Stout/porter 49 All beer 232  50 
    20 (local) Malt 38   57  
     Non malt 24       
Wine     1/   70%  45%   *367= 70 50 
Spirits   70%   65%   1,102= 70 100 
Other beverages (soft drinks)             
Mineral water   10%   10%   37.5= 39 30 
Sodas   13%   20%   .na. 39 40 
Cider   70%   35%   .na.   
Mobile air time   10%   10%   10%   
Motor vehicles   2/             
Engine over 3000cc 10%   40%   10%  100 
Engine 2000cc to 3000cc 10%   20%   10%  100 
Engine less than 2000cc 10%   10%   0%  30,60 
  
Source: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda); Ministry of Finance and Kenya Revenue Authority; Tanzania 
Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance (Kenya), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Republic of Rwanda; and Ministry of 
Revenue, Government of Ethiopia 
Notes:   1/    TSh 743  if domestic grape content is less than 75 percent 
             2/  Ethiopia:  Motor vehicles up to 1,300 cc 30%, 1301 to 1800cc 60% and over 1800 100% 
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Table A4.1: Actual and adjusted tax revenues in billion Uganda shillings, 1988/89-2003/2004 
 
 Direct taxes Import duties Excise Duties VAT/sales tax Overall tax 
  Actual Adjusted Actual Adjusted Actual Adjusted Actual Adjusted Actual Adjusted 
1988/89 6.18 4.76 7.79 7.56 4.91 4.91 18.48 18.48 44.60 35.70 
1989/90 12.26 5.74 25.08 19.96 7.25 6.58 30.29 28.16 89.57 50.25 
1990/91 17.63 6.33 49.58 36.07 12.42 6.58 39.61 33.88 133.79 57.53 
1991/92 27.29 7.09 76.04 49.43 15.03 6.58 48.66 38.23 180.46 62.26 
1992/93 50.03 10.18 121.20 67.64 18.78 8.22 83.84 65.72 282.60 84.76 
1993/94 59.47 13.04 145.39 79.11 41.78 16.43 108.88 82.51 373.35 104.56 
1994/95 76.91 13.75 184.80 93.7 50.61 16.66 150.97 110.26 506.99 118.41 
1995/96 83.41 14.91 226.62 109.47 67.09 20.84 187.95 129.53 611.70 126.11 
1996/97 108.39 17.00 269.73 128.57 104.01 28.61 217.09 129.54 735.92 132.22 
1997/98 131.62 20.65 266.32 131.32 115.78 31.85 260.93 155.70 812.29 140.82 
1998/99 170.07 26.68 289.69 131.32 129.65 36.35 321.26 191.70 958.28 154.26 
1999/00 180.52 28.32 302.29 138.11 131.37 36.23 343.13 204.75 1008.00 154.14 
2000/01 223.06 35.8 340.31 144.61 125.57 33.81 374.2 213.84 1110.15 156.85 
2001/02 288.32 44.93 339.39 144.22 139.26 33.67 431.8 246.75 1251.25 166.18 
2002/03 359.02 55.01 373.75 155.84 148.07 35.08 495.47 283.14 1438.42 180.66 
2003/04 464.02 69.52 403.76 168.36 177.39 38.57 573.52 329.67 1694.81 200.60 
 
Source:  Uganda Revenue Authority and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
Note:  Adjusted revenues are computed figures using the proportional adjustment technique described in the methodology section. 
 
 
 
Table A4.2: Tax revenue obtained through discretionary measures as percentage of actual revenue from 
respective sources 
 
Financial Year 
Direct taxes Import duties Excise Duties VAT/sales tax Overall tax 
1988/89 23.06 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.72 
1989/90 39.15 17.94 9.24 7.03 13.51 
1990/91 23.26 8.59 41.63 8.00 12.48 
1991/92 27.74 10.65 17.37 8.14 12.32 
1992/93 21.63 14.14 0.00 0.24 9.96 
1993/94 -7.75 2.51 10.15 3.32 1.85 
1994/95 18.46 6.81 16.32 3.62 7.99 
1995/96 0.00 4.73 5.62 5.63 4.10 
1996/97 12.26 1.33 11.46 13.42 7.87 
1997/98 0.00 -3.45 0.00 0.00 -1.13 
1998/99 0.00 8.07 -1.93 0.00 2.18 
1999/00 0.00 -0.78 1.64 0.00 -0.02 
2000/01 -2.32 6.99 2.35 4.23 3.37 
2001/02 2.91 0.00 10.20 0.00 1.81 
2002/03 1.67 1.87 2.03 0.00 1.11 
2003/04 2.22 0.00 8.23 -0.59 1.25 
 
Source: Tax Policy Department and Budget Speeches (various years), Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development  
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UGANDA: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR INCOME ELASTICITIES AND BUOYANCIES 
 
 
Table A4.3: Buoyancy and Elasticity Indexes of Main Taxes, 1988/89-2003/04 
 
 Buoyancy t-ratio R-squared DW Elasticity  t-ratio R-squared DW 
Direct taxes 1.495 33.295 0.988 0.403 0.938 12.874 0.922 0.307 
Import duties 1.321 18.835 0.962 0.613 1.048 16.988 0.954 0.644 
Excise duties 1.429 23.823 0.976 1.252 0.919 13.529 0.929 0.854 
VAT/sales tax 1.310 39.030 0.991 0.610 1.009 32.790 0.987 0.931 
Overall tax system 1.311 73.824 0.997 1.611 0.636 27.221 0.981 1.401 
  
 
Table A4.4: Decomposition of the Tax-to-Income Elasticity of Main Taxes, 1988/89-2003/04 
 
 
Tax-to-base 
elasticity t-ratio R2 DW 
Base-to-income 
elasticity t-ratio R2 DW 
Direct taxes 0.623 16.039 0.948 0.399 1.519 38.471 0.991 1.518 
Import duties 0.896 15.838 0.947 0.911 1.157 29.965 0.985 0.847 
Excise duties 1.006 13.057 0.924 0.819 0.940 106.564 0.999 1.349 
VAT/sales tax 1.076 28.692 0.983 0.745 0.940 106.564 0.999 1. 
 
 
Table A4.5: Buoyancy and Elasticity Indexes of Main Taxes, 1988/89-1995/96 
 
 Buoyancy t-ratio R-squared DW Elasticity  t-ratio R-squared DW 
Direct taxes 1.337 48.688 0.997 2.226 0.706 9.363 0.936 1.230 
Import duties 1.569 12.935 0.965 0.945 1.256 11.707 0.958 1.042 
Excise duties 1.333 11.718 0.958 1.865 0.705 5.502 0.835 1.198 
VAT/sales tax 1.192 18.609 0.983 0.906 1.037 13.592 0.969 1.061 
Overall tax system 1.299 32.575 0.994 1.465 0.648 11.275 0.955 1.458 
 
 
Table A4.6: Decomposition of the Tax-to-Income Elasticity of Main Taxes, 1988/89-1995/96 
 
 
Tax-to-base 
elasticity t-ratio R2 DW 
Base-to-income 
elasticity t-ratio R2 DW 
Direct taxes 0.479 11.859 0.959 1.590 1.479 19.634 0.985 2.516 
Import duties 1.066 9.890 0.942 1.155 1.166 34.042 0.995 2.337 
Excise duties 0.830 5.358 0.827 1.176 0.965 100.203 0.835 1.696 
VAT/sales tax 1.073 13.037 0.966 0.956 0.965 100.203 0.835 1.696 
 
 
Table A4.7: Buoyancy and Elasticity Indexes of Main Taxes, 1996/97-2003/04 
 
 Buoyancy t-ratio R-squared DW Elasticity  t-ratio R-squared DW 
Direct taxes 2.145 14.666 0.973 1.667 2.082 14.342 0.972 1.782 
Import duties 0.637 10.515 0.949 1.703 0.382 7.767 0.910 0.854 
Excise duties 0.664 6.850 0.887 1.834 0.304 2.827 0.571 1.213 
VAT/sales tax 1.386 17.045 0.980 2.347 1.306 15.278 0.975 1,998 
Overall tax system 1.202 15.113 0.974 1.632 0.545 8.293 0.920 2.315 
 
 
Table A4.8: Decomposition of the Tax-to-Income Elasticity of Main Taxes, 1996/97-2003/04 
 
 
Tax-to-base 
elasticity t-ratio R2 DW 
Base-to-income 
elasticity t-ratio R2 DW 
Direct taxes 1.031 18.815 0.983 1.637 2.021 14.508 0.972 1.962 
Import duties 0.244 1.597 0.298 0.441 0.638 2.476 0.505 1.252 
Excise duties 0.325 2.407 0.491 1.160 0.857 16.049 0.977 1.725 
VAT/sales tax 1.452 9.479 0.937 1.905 0.857 16.049 0.977 1.725 
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Table A4.4. Tax Reforms in Uganda 1989-2004  
MAJOR REFORMS 
 
Year 
 Opening up of more offices of income tax department and intensifying staff training and enhance 
incentive to revenue collectors  
 
 
1989/90 
 Payment of taxes through commercial banks introduced,  to minimize fraud and increase efficiency in 
revenue collection 
1990/91 
 URA set up with the view of improving tax administration  
 The National Customs Tariff System based on the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature was 
replaced with the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
 Introduction of withholding tax 
1991/92 
 Introduction of Tax Identification Numbers (TIN) and computerization of income tax department 1994/95 
 Introduction of VAT at a standard rate of 17% to replace CTL and Sales tax.  1996/97 
 Introduction of a new Income Tax Act 
1997/98 
 Abolished discretionary powers under Section 4 of the Tariff Management Act  1970 for the Minister of 
Finance to  remit import duty and excise duty under the Customs and Excise Law 
 Introduced GATT valuation method in place BDV and abolished pre-shipment inspection. 
2000/01 
 
 
2000/01 
 Export duty on coffee, abolished 
1992/93 
 Coffee stabilization tax, abolished 
1996/97 
OTHER  REFORM MEASURES  
Direct Taxes  
 Uganda Railways Corporation (URC), Uganda Airlines Corporation, Uganda Posts and 
Telecommunication exempted from corporation tax   
1987/88 
 Duty payable on all industrial raw materials suspended    
 Waiving of stamp duty on mortgages through the Uganda and East African Development Banks    
 Corporation tax  reduced from 60% to 45% for all tax  payers including industry and agriculture 
1989/90 
 The corporation tax  reduced from 45% to 40% in a bid to promote investment through the retention of 
earnings, and to attract new foreign and local investment  
1990/91 
 The maximum individual income tax rate of 50% to apply on an annual income of more than Shs. 2.62 
million, being revised from Shs1.2 million. 
1991/92 
 The corporate tax rate, reduced from 40% to 35% in order to encourage investment  
1992/93 
 Corporation tax rate reduced from 35% to 30% 1993/94 
 Introduction of 16% rental tax of gross rental income (on rental income payable to individual landlords), 
but subject to the personal income tax threshold 
  
 The rate of withholding taxes increased from 2% to 4% on supply of any goods, raw materials or 
services on the execution of any contract 
1994/95 
 Rental income payable by individual landlords was reduced from a withholding tax rate of 15% to 10%.   
 Income tax threshold increased Ushs 840,000 to Ush 1,200,000 per annum. Abolished lunch and 
transport allowances, thus increasing the threshold for tax by 43 percent of previous beneficiaries 
1995/96 
 Abolished tax on interest income on fixed accounts and commercial banks deposits held for a period 
exceeding two years 
  
 Abolition of income tax exemption on all locally recruited employees of NGO's and Diplomatic missions 1996/97 
 Amended Section 31 of Income Tax Act to allow the expenses incurred by companies, in respect of 
initial public offerings on the stock exchange  
2001/02 
 Introduced 4% withholding tax on the income of resident professions   
 Abolished exemption on interest earned on Treasury Bills   
 Section 23 of the Income Tax Act will be amended to remove the double taxation of housing allowance 
paid to employees. 
  
 Amending the Income Tax Act to allow lesser to claim capital depreciation benefits 2004/05 
VAT/Sales Tax/CTL 
 
 Reduction of sales tax from 10% to 5% on buses and lorries, 110% to 90% on beer, 60 to 50% on Rex 
and Sportsman brand of cigarettes and from 45 to 35% on Kali cigarettes 
1988/89 
 Reduction of sales tax from 25% to 10% on locally manufactured textiles   
 30% sales tax imposed on imported soap and 10% on locally produced soap   
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 Sales tax on sugar, abolished   
 10% CTL extended to all restaurants and eating places in Kampala and major towns   
 Sales tax introduced on all zero rated and exempt products 1989/90 
 The sales tax rate bands reduced to a two rate structure: 30% and 60%  1990/91 
 The CTL rates were harmonized from 10% and 20% to 10% for all tax pays 1991/92 
 The CTL rate was raised from 10% to 15% with the catchments areas widened to include water utilities 
and civil aviation utilities 
1992/93 
 Road user collection points were abolished except for two only (Entebbe Airport)   
 The CTL on drinks re-imposed in eating houses, bars and entertainment centers from ex-factory point  1993/94 
 The sales tax rates structure was amended from a nine-rate structure to a four-rate structure ranging 
from 0% - 30% in preparation for VAT 
  
 CTL on export services abolished 1994/95 
 CTL levied on goods vehicles at the same time as the motor vehicle license is paid    
 Removal of sales tax on important foodstuffs like milk, and maize flour. Reduced sales tax on 
construction wood and timber from  30% to 15% 
1995/96 
 Abolished VAT on computers and accessories  2002/03 
 VAT exemption on hotel accommodation limited to hotels outside Kampala and Entebbe only. 2003/04 
Import Taxes 
 
 Import duty of 255% imposed on imported sugar   1988/89 
 Import duty of 60% imposed on imported soap     
 Import commission raised from 0.5 to 1% and extended to petroleum products    
 Introduction of customs duties on all imported raw materials at the rate of 10% in order to encourage 
the utilization of local raw materials 
  
 All zero rated customs duties were raised to 10% for purposes of raising revenue   
 The numerous customs duty rate bands - reduced to five ranging from 10% to 50% with rates above 
50% abolished   
1990/91 
 Taxes on government imports - abolished   
 Import duty on raw materials abolished (except for those locally available) 1992/93 
 Import duty exemptions extended to educational materials, newspapers, journals and printed 
manuscripts 
  
 The ban on importation of vehicles more than four years old was lifted   
 Re-exports from bonded warehouses were authorized with a 2% re-export levy being charged   
 Stamp duty - raised from 1% to 3%    
 The bulk of the petroleum products to be taxed at ad varolem rather than specific rates   
 Introduced 10% import duty on all raw material inputs  1993/94 
 Introduced 10% import duty on imported agricultural inputs including agricultural machinery and tools 
(excluding fertilizers, pesticides and seed) 
  
 The customs tariff structure reduced from six rates to four rates ranging from 0% - 30%   
 A ban on the importation of tobacco products lifted 1994/95 
 60% import duty imposed on tobacco products   
 Shifted from SITC to HS Code systems for customs classification 1995/96 
 Harmonized raw material import duty rate to 5%   
 Re-instated duty draw back scheme to allow refund for duty paid on all inputs into production of exports   
 Reduced the duty rate  and sales tax for special purpose commercial  vehicles to 0%, 10% and 15% 
duty and sales tax respectively for passengers transport vehicles 
  
 Abolished duty free imports for purposes of revenue accountability and control.  With exception of 
Entebbe Airport, all other inland duty free shops were to wind up by September 30th, 1995 
1995/96 
 Valuation of goods by Pre-Inspection firms (for selected range of goods/imports)   
 Implementation of 80% COMESA tariff reduction and introduction of a 10% surtax on all commodities 
coming from COMESA 
1996/97 
 Reversal of ad valorem rates of petroleum taxes   
 Reduction of maximum import duty rates from 30% to 20% 1997/98 
 Reduction of all excise surcharges down to 10%   
 Reduction of fuel duty rates for petrol, diesel, and kerosene by 10% each to 215%, 160% and 105% 
respectively 
  
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 Reduction of the import duty bands from a four rate duty structure  of 0,5,10,and 20% to a three tariff 
band structure of 0,7, and 15% 
1998/99 
 Movement from ad valorem to specific duty rates on fuel, reduction of fuel duty rates per liter by Shs 
30/= for petrol, Shs 60/= for diesel and Shs.30/= for kerosene  
  
 Reduction in import duty rates from 15% to 7% for specially adapted tourist vehicles 1999/00 
 Reduction of import duty from 15% to 7% on specially designed tourism vehicles   
 Reduced the freight cost in the tax base on freighted goods by 70%   
 Jet kerosene reduced from 9.5 US cents per gallon to 5 cents per gallon   
 The airport service charge of $20 to be included in the ticket cost   
 Duty free allowance for miscellaneous goods increased from $100 to $300    
 100% exemption of the airfreight element in the tax base for freighted goods 2000/01 
 Exemption of VAT and import duty on mosquito nets and materials for making such nets    
 Remission of duty and zero VAT for inputs for the manufacture of agricultural inputs    
 Rebate for inputs for producers of texts books on proof that the materials were used in the production of 
text books 
  
 Waived the 4% withholding tax on imported raw materials   
 Waived the 2% import commission on imported raw materials   
 Remitted duty on life jackets and fishing gear 2001/02 
 Introduced tax stamps on both domestic and imported cigarettes   
 Specific duty on petrol adjusted from Shs 580 per liter to Shs 610 per litre  2002/03 
 Abolished import commission on a number of goods, especially horticultural inputs 2003/04 
 Abolished import duty and VAT on imported head gear and life jackets   
 Remitted  7% import duty on safety belts  2004/05 
 Increase import commission on imports to 6%   
Excise Tax   
 Excise tax reduced from 100% to 75% on beer, 75% to 55% on Rex and Sportsman cigarettes and 45% 
to 35% on Kali cigarettes, and 3% excise imposed on soap.  
1988/98 
 An excise duty of 5%, introduced on plastics, mattresses, paints and excise books 1989/90 
 The excise duties were restricted to alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, cigarettes, and soap products 
except bar soap 
1990/91 
 The excise duty rate structure, adjusted from 30% and 60% to 30% and 50% 1991/92 
 Excise increased from 30% to 100% for all imported luxury goods  1993/94 
 The excise duty structure was altered to give a rate structure of 0, 10, 30 50, 70, and 100 percent rate 
chargeable on soft drinks, beer and cigarettes  
  
 A reduction in excise duty rates from 80% to 70% on beer and from 50% to 40% on soft drinks in order 
to stimulate domestic manufacturing  
1994/95 
 Harmonized  calculation of excise duty  on all local goods by making the excise payable on the full ex-
factory price for all excisable goods 
1995/96 
 Reduced excise duty for beer industry from 70% to 55%. Standardized excise duty rates for large cars 
and for TV sets from 30-50% to 20% 
  
 Adjustments in excise duty rates as follows: beer from 55% to 70%, Sodas from 40% to 55%, 
Cigarettes from 100% to 122%, and Spirits form 30% to 45% 
1996/97 
 Reduction in excise duty rates for beer from 65% to 60% and 30% to 25% for soft drinks 1998/99 
 A reduction from 25% to 20% in excise duty rate on soft drinks 1999/00 
 All soft drinks made from concentrates to be subject to excise duty at 20%   
 Soft drinks made from locally grown fruits exempted from excise duty   
 All vehicles above 2250 cc to attract a harmonized excise duty at 10% 2000/01 
 Removed excise duty on bicycles and spares and harmonized import duty at 15%   
 Reduce excise duty on soft drinks from 20% to 15% 2000/01 
 Increase excise duty on cigarettes from 122%  to 130% 2001/02 
 Increase excise duty on beers from 60% to 70%   
 Introduced 10% excise duty on cellular airtime.   
 Reduction of excise duty on beer from 70% to 60% 2002/03 
 Raising the excise duty on motor vehicles by 5% from 10% to 15%, except on commercial vehicles   
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 Imposed excise duty of 20% on polyethylene bags for environmental reasons   
 Increase excise duty on used articles from 10% to 15%   
 Increase excise duty on sugar from 10% to 25%   
 Reduced excise duty on carbonated waters (soft drinks) from 15% to 13% 2003/04 
 Beer made from malt of locally produced raw materials to pay excise duty at 20%   
 Cellular air time excise duty increase from 7% to 10%   
 Increased excise duty on petrol by Shs 50 per litre and on diesel by Shs 30 per litre   
 Increase excise duty on cigarettes from 130% to 150% 2004/05 
 Increase excise duty on spirits from 45% to 60%   
 
Others: Administrative related measures including fees, exports and special exemptions 
  
 All exemptions from tax except those under bilateral agreements with foreign countries and accredited 
international institutions were abolished. Those granted to investors under the Investment Code except 
for construction materials were retained. 
1993/94 
 A coffee stabilization tax imposed at a rate of 20% for receipts exceeding shs 1,100/= per kg and a rate 
of 40% for receipts exceeding shs 2200/- per kg.  
1994/95 
 Threshold of the coffee stabilization tax set at Ush 1500 per Kg. Tax of 25% for earnings above it 1995/96 
 Government to pay taxes for donor or NGO  funded projects inputs   
 Fees for a one year driving permit raised from Ush 5,500 to Sh 14,000 for a new driving permit and Ush 
4,125 to Sh 8,000 for renewal; 2% charge for changing ownership of vehicles changed at a fixed rate of 
Ush 10,000 for motor cycles, Ush 30,000 for cars and Ush 50,000 for commercial vehicles 
  
 Increase in the levy on lotteries and gambling from 10% to 15% 1996/97 
 Reduction of stamp duty on mortgages from 1% to 0.5%   
 Amnesty of arrears of license fees up to 31.12. 1997, for all heavy vehicles and trailers granted 1998/99 
 An amnesty for all arrears of sales tax, CTL and the coffee stabilization tax given 1999/00 
 Liberalized the manufacture and distribution of vehicle number plates    
 Abolished the monopoly of UCB in handling URA revenues   
 Provided 20% initial allowance for new industrial buildings 2000/01 
 5% annual write off allowed for industrial buildings extended for new commercial buildings. The 
definition of industrial buildings was extended to include hotels and lodges 
  
 New PAYE regulations to establish a system of cumulative calculation of PAYE   
 4% withholding tax to apply only to non compliant taxpayers    
 Concluded Double Taxation Agreements with South Africa, Norway and Denmark 2001/02 
 All government contracts awarded only to VAT registered persons  2002/03 
 Warehousing period extended to 24 months form the 12 months   
 Bank of Uganda exempted from income tax under the Income Tax Act   
 A 15% livestock development levy on all raw hides and skins of bovine animals leaving Uganda   
 Abolished students visa fees for Kenyan and Tanzanian students in Uganda   
 Increased automobile fees/licenses from Shs110 per cc to Shs 200 per cc except cars and passenger 
vehicles carrying more than 28 people 
2003/04 
 Revised traffic fees and charges upwards by 10% 2004/05 
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 Notes 
                                                 
1 Domestic direct taxes include pay as you earn (PAYE), corporate, withholding, and rental income tax, tax 
on bank interest, casino and lottery, among others. Indirect taxes comprise custom duty, excise duty; value 
added tax and various fees and licenses.  
 
2 Indirect domestic taxes, unlike import duties, do not necessarily reduce international trade flows by 
distorting domestic relative prices in favor of domestically produced goods over internationally produced 
goods.  
 
3 Uganda was found to be the country with the lowest tax effort for 1977 in a sample of 34 countries, while 
Rwanda was the lowest in 1994 (Tanzi, 1981; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997). These were years of high 
political unrest in these countries.  
 
4 The distributional impact of the tax system, however, is not really complete without an analysis of the 
impact of the resultant expenditure. Whilst this has been beyond the scope of the current excise, it would be 
important to carry out such an analysis to ensure a full analysis of the impact of the reform program. 
 
5 The LTD was meant to be a ‘one-stop’ facility for large taxpayers, handling both VAT and Income tax 
assessment. The LTD provided for self-assessment and filing of tax returns directly to the bank with tax 
payments. This system was supposed to be extended to the medium and small taxpayers. However, in 2002 
URA restructured some departments and abolished LTD. There was a section of the taxpayers who 
perceived that URA was using LTD to extort revenue from a few taxpayers. The TAT was particularly 
intended to speedily adjudicate tax disputes in an environment less intimidating than the courts of law. 
Although tax appeals mechanism has contributed to making the tax regime in Uganda a fair one since the 
taxpayers have a place independent of URA to appeal to, it is still characterized by bureaucratic delays in 
handling cases. Cases, on average, take between 7 and 10 months from the date of filing until the date of 
decision.  
 
6 The following types of audits are generally implemented in connection with VAT (and income tax) 
systems: desk verifications, registration checks, VAT refund audits, issue-oriented audits, comprehensive 
audits, and tax refund investigations. 
 
7 The definition of income includes all employee remuneration, in whatever form, including benefit-in-
kind. Capital gains arising from the disposal of assets used in a business are included in taxable income. 
 
8 Standard exemptions include health, education and welfare services, immovable property, cultural and 
postal services, financial services, betting and gaming, non-profit organizations. Other exemptions include 
basic foodstuffs and other essential products. The products covered by ‘other’ exemptions can also be taxed 
at a reduced or zero rate 
 
9 Registered firms under VAT are entitled to claim the VAT money paid on goods/services, and permitted a 
full and immediate deduction (tax credit) for the VAT on inputs (including capital goods) from the VAT on 
outputs, including VAT on utilities (e.g. water, electricity, and telephones) from their output VAT.  
 
10 These countries are Ireland, the United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, Belize, Canada, Jamaica, Mexico, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
11 18 countries out of 105 countries with VAT apply the same rate to all taxable goods and services. These 
countries are: Denmark, Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Norway, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Western Samoa, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Ukraine (Cnossen, 
2003). 
 
12 A report by a commission of enquiry into the alleged corruption in the URA implicated several URA 
officers for corruption. In the Monitor (newspaper) of November 19,2004, Ms Allen Kagina, the New 
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Commissioner General of Uganda Revenue Authority admitted that corruption is a problem in the tax body: 
“corruption is going to be handled. It is not something that we are going to keep in the cupboard”.   
 
13 They can allow or disallow expenses or charges, or exempt import duty on an imported item. While 
evaluating imports, corrupt officials take advantage of the ignorance of the taxpayer to have him/her to 
believe that his/her imports fall under the tariff codes for higher duty rates, when it is not the case. In the 
process the importer will be compelled to pay bribes for the ‘tax adjustment’. 
 
14 Justice Julie Sebutinde led the commission that investigated into the alleged corruption in the URA. On 
Monday August 16, 2004 the High Court nullified the report of the commission. The ruling rendered it 
unusable as a public document. The government is appealing to restore the report so it can be implemented.  
 
15 The World Bank (1996), and Ablo and Reinikka (1998) provide qualitative and quantitative evidence on 
problems in service delivery in Uganda. 
 
16  Discretionary changes for the purpose of this study are defined as legal changes in tax rates or in the tax 
base, introduction of new taxes, and certain administrative efforts.  
 
17  The proxy base for direct taxes used in this study is domestic factor incomes, and for import duties we 
have used c.i.f value of imports, and private final consumption for excise duties and VAT/sales tax. See 
methodology section for details. The elasticity of a tax in this analysis refers to the responsiveness of the 
tax revenue to changes in GDP (or its proxy base), assuming that no changes are made in the tax legislation 
over time. It measures the revenue that would be generated automatically if the tax system were to remain 
unchanged over time.  
 
18 Tax buoyancy reflects both the built-in income elasticity of a tax and discretionary changes (changes to the tax rates 
and bases) that have been introduced. 
 
